Three essays on fiscal federalism and market structure by Redonda, Agustin & Jametti, Mario
Three Essays on Fiscal Federalism and
Market Structure
Agustin Redonda
Faculty of Economics
Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Lugano, June 2015
Doctoral committee:
Prof. Mario Jametti, Università della Svizzera italiana, Supervisor
Prof. Raphaël Parchet, Università della Svizzera italiana, Internal member
Prof. Marius Brülhart, Université de Lausanne, External member
Prof. Patrick Lenain, OECD, Université de Paris-Est Créteil, External member
A Marce y a Tomi que son mi cable a tierra y a mis viejos que, a pesar
de la distancia, me apoyaron en todo...desde el principio y desde antes
también.
i
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Mario Jametti, for the patient guidance, encouragement
and advice he has provided throughout my time as his student. I would also like to thank the
other members of the thesis committee: Prof. Raphaël Parchet, Prof. Marius Brülhart and
Prof. Patrick Lenain for having spent part of their time in providing precious suggestions on my
research. Finally, a big thank to all my colleagues at IdEP for the great time we spent together
during these years. Completing my thesis would have been all the more difficult without their
support and friendship.
ii
Introduction
This thesis assesses two different sub-fields inside public economics in general and taxation
in particular: tax incidence and tax competition. The thesis is composed of three chapters.
While the first chapter analyzes the incidence of taxes in the Canadian retail gasoline market,
the second one focuses on the tax competition among Swiss cantons by assessing the impact
of introducing a flat tax reform on profits on corporate location decisions. Finally, the third
chapter aims at setting a comprehensive model merging these two strands of literature. Let me
now give you a brief description of the three chapters.
In the first chapter, “The Power to Pass on Taxes - A Test for Tax Shifting Based on Ob-
servables” (with Mario Jametti and Anindya Sen), we devise a novel empirical test, based on
observables, to assess whether taxes are under- or overshifted in an oligopolistic market. We
apply our test to the Canadian retail gasoline market using a panel data set of 10 cities for
the 1991 − 1997 period. Since gasoline has a relatively inelastic demand, raising government
revenue via gasoline taxes could appear appropriate as it entails a relatively small deadweight
loss. However, the Canadian gasoline retail is a highly concentrated market and, hence, the
assumption of perfect competition when considering tax incidence might be misleading. Theo-
retically, in oligopolistic markets taxes can be shifted forward less (more) than proportionally
to retail prices; a possibility usually denoted by undershifting (overshifting). Generally, this
depends on unobservable parameters of the demand and cost functions. Our test suggests that
the under-/overshifting of taxes can be empirically determined by the sign of an interaction term
between tax rates and market structure. When taking our test to data, our results suggest that,
in Canada, gasoline taxes are undershifted.
The second chapter, “Corporate Flat Tax Reforms and Firms’ Location Choices. Evidence
from Switzerland” (with Sergio Galletta), empirically assesses corporate tax competition by an-
alyzing the impact of a flat-tax reform on profit taxation on firms’ location decisions in Switzer-
land. Our identification strategy is based on the observed trend in the Confederation where,
since 1990, several cantons have been switching from a graduated rate tax (GRT) scheme on
profits to a flat rate tax (FRT) system. We thus exploit the different timing of the introduction
of these reforms by Swiss cantons to estimate the impact on the stock of firms in Swiss munici-
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palities (and cantons) by applying a panel-based differences-in-differences approach. Our results
show that the introduction of a flat-tax reform on corporate taxes has a negative (rather small)
impact on the number of firms in a given jurisdiction. Interestingly, this effect is considerably
larger for small firms. The latter result confirms the existence of an insurance effect suggesting
that the progressivity of the tax system has a positive effect on the number of firms because it
acts as an insurance for risk-averse entrepreneurs.
As suggested by the title, the third chapter, “Market structure and the functional form of
demand, the missing links between tax incidence and tax competition”, merges tax incidence
and tax competition frameworks and, hence, links the two first chapters of this thesis. These
two strands of literature have largely been studied separately. Tax incidence settings do not
consider any strategic interactions (neither horizontal nor vertical) and exclusively assess the
pass-through of taxes to prices. These models focus on imperfectly competitive markets where
prices can react more (less) than proportionally to a variation in tax rates. On the other hand,
tax competition settings focus on the strategic interactions arising because of a shared tax base
but assume producer prices to be constant. Thus, the pass-through of taxes is restricted to be
fully on consumers. This chapter sets a theoretical framework where the tax setting is endoge-
nized and local governments internalize the possibility that taxes are overshifted (undershifted).
The contribution of the chapter is twofold. First it formalizes the correspondence between
the over-/under shifting condition from tax incidence models and the strategic complemen-
tarity/substitutability result from tax competition settings. Second, by relaxing the standard
assumption in tax competition models that producer prices are constant, the model explicitly
allows the pass-through of taxes to play a key role in the tax setting process. In particular, by
accounting for the impact of market structure on the sensitivity of the vertical reaction function
that was previously ruled out in previous tax competition studies.
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Chapter 1
The Power to Pass on Taxes - A Test
for Tax Shifting based on
Observables
1.1 Introduction
Most countries tax gasoline, although to varying degrees. Since gasoline has a relatively inelastic
demand, raising government revenue via gasoline taxes could appear appropriate as it entails
a relatively small deadweight loss. However, gasoline retail is generally a highly concentrated
market leading to prices that are significantly above marginal cost. Hence, tax incidence analysis
based on the assumption of perfectly competitive markets might be misleading. Whereas in long-
run equilibrium, under perfect competition, taxes are passed on fully to consumers (are fully
shifted), the situation in oligopolistic markets is different. Taxes can either be shifted forward
less or more than proportionally to retail prices, i.e. they can be under- or overshifted.
The condition whether taxes are under- or overshifted depends theoretically on parameters of
the demand and cost functions. These are often unobservable to the econometrician or inherently
difficult to estimate. In this paper we devise a novel empirical test, based on observables,
to identify whether a market presents under-, full or overshifting. We show that whether a
particular market displays under- or overshifting can be assessed by the sign of an interaction
term between tax rates and market structure. We then take our test to data. We use a dataset
on the Canadian retail gasoline market comprising monthly observations from 10 Canadian cities
over the 1991 − 1997 period. In Canada gasoline is taxed both at the federal and provincial
levels. The market is dominated by a few vertically integrated national (global) players implying
a significant level of market concentration. This also holds at the local level possibly due to
cost advantages from vertical integration or other barriers to entry. Both variation across time
1
(including several provincial tax changes) and across locations help us identify our coefficients
of interest.
Our results suggest that the direct effect of taxes is not statistically different from 1 indicat-
ing, in line with theory, that, under perfect competition, gasoline taxes in the Canadian retail
market are fully shifted to consumers. Similarly, as expected, an increase in market concentra-
tion - measured through changes to city specific Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices - raises prices.
Our main coefficient of interest, the interaction term between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
and excise tax rates, is negative and, in most specifications, statistically significant. This implies
that taxes in the Canadian retail gasoline market are undershifted. We apply a series of robust-
ness checks including alternative specifications for inference and controlling for the potential
endogeneity of taxes and market structure. Our results are robust.
Assessing tax incidence in the gasoline market is of particular concern for policy analysis.
First, gasoline is an important input. Moreover, in recent years, gasoline taxation has been
one of the main tools to encourage rolling back CO2 emissions.1 Finally, the financial crisis of
2008 has considerably increased pressure on governments all around the world to reduce budget
deficits. From this point of view, gasoline taxes might play an important role as a source of
revenues for both local and central governments.2
Further, we would argue that our results point to a potentially important omission in earlier
analyses of tax incidence in oligopolistic markets. First, most empirical applications either
implicitly or explicitly assume perfectly competitive markets, or they cursorie control for market
structure (via a main effect). We show that not accounting for the interdependence of market
structure and taxes by not including an interaction term might result in a misspecified model.
In our study, not accounting for the differential effect of taxes depending on market structure
results in an underestimation of tax incidence (evaluated at the mean of HHI) of around 20%.
Similarly, in our sample, tax incidence varies from not significantly different from full absorption
by producers in the most concentrated markets, to not significantly different from full shifting
in the least concentrated ones. Thus, policy conclusions might need to be adapted depending
on the degree of (local) market concentration. Finally, a point estimate of tax incidence without
appropriately controlling for market structure might produce a coefficient larger than but not
statistically different from one. Such an estimate might lead authors to conclude that taxes are
fully shifted, when indeed they are overshifted. We would argue that our test is a more precise
instrument to assess tax incidence leading to potentially improved policy conclusions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2 we present the existing literature
in the field. Section 1.3 gives a brief description of the gasoline industry and taxes in Canada.
1See, for example, Palazzi (2011).
2As mentioned in the OECD Tax Database, currently around 4% of total tax revenue in Canada comes from
environmentally related taxes.
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In Section 1.4 we describe our dataset and the empirical framework. In Section 1.5, we discuss
our main results and illustrate the potential of inadequate policy conclusions. Finally, Section
1.6, provides some concluding remarks.
1.2 Literature background
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) were among the first to suggest that in oligopolistic and monop-
olistic markets taxes could be overshifted to final prices. Subsequently, a number of theoretical
papers have taken up this point.3 Katz and Rosen (1985) showed that the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave
result can be rationalized in a standard neoclassical model. They find that assuming competi-
tive or monopolistic markets when indeed a sector is imperfectly competitive can lead to bias in
the estimation of tax incidence. Further, they illustrate that tax incidence depends on market
structure. Similarly, Seade (1985) introduces a cost-side shifter in the equilibrium solution of
an oligopolistic market. Under oligopoly (and assuming linear costs), price overshifting turns
out to be a likely scenario. Overshifting will occur “if and only if the elasticity of the slope
of inverse demand (E) is greater than 1”.4 Note that this is always the case for an isoelastic
demand. Besley (1989) extends Seade’s paper by allowing for entry in the market. He finds
that there is undershifting if the demand function is concave and there is overshifting if it is
convex. Also, overshifting is more likely under free entry. Delipalla and Keen (1992) compare
the incidence of excise and ad valorem taxes in two oligopoly models, with and without free
entry finding that that specific taxes are more likely to be overshifted than ad valorem ones.
Finally, Anderson et al. (2001) extend Delipalla and Keen (1992) by studying the incidence of
ad valorem and excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry allowing for product differentiation and
price-setting firms à la Bertrand. Interestingly, their results are very close to those of a Cournot
model with homogeneous products.
Summarizing these contributions, the pass-through of taxes or the presence of under- or
overshifting generally depends on the functional form of the demand and the cost functions,
i.e parameters that are not directly observable to the econometrician. Based on the theoretical
literature above, we derive a test to detect whether a particular market displays under- or
overshifting which depends on observables, namely on the interaction between taxes and market
structure.5
Tax incidence and market structure have also been studied empirically. An early contribution
is Harris (1987). The author studies the 1983 federal cigarette tax increase in the United States.
3A more detailed review can be found in Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
4Seade (1985), p.28.
5In Subsection 1.4.2 we give the intuition of the theoretical background behind our test that is formally derived
in the Appendix.
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He finds that the 36% increase in the real price of a pack of cigarettes (adjusted for general
inflation) was mainly explained by the raise in prices charged by the major U.S. manufacturers
and not by the increase in the federal excise tax. Besley and Rosen (1999) examine the incidence
of sales taxes for 12 commodities in 155 U.S. cities over the 1982 − 1990 period and examine
the extent to which differences in tax rates and bases are reflected in prices. They find variation
in the shifting patterns. For some commodities they cannot reject full shifting but for others
they find overshifting. Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) analyze the incidence of ad valorem and
specific taxes in the European cigarette market. Basing their analysis on data from the 12
members of the E.U., prior to its expansion in 1995, they find that commodity taxes are not
always fully shifted to consumers. Indeed, they show that taxes are overshifted in southern
European countries, but there is undershifting in the north of Europe where the pressure of the
health lobby is stronger. Moreover, their results reject both extremes, i.e. perfect competition
and collusive behavior.
Two papers among the large literature on gasoline tax incidence are of particular interest
for our study. Chouinard and Perloff (2007) study price differences across U.S. states. They
find that most of the increase in national gasoline prices over the 1990s is explained by a rise in
the price of crude oil. Other factors such as taxes and market power did not have a significant
impact on the price increase observed during that decade. On the other hand, differences among
states in retail gasoline prices are largely explained by variations in taxes and market power.
More recently, Marion and Muehlegger (2011) analyze the pass-through rate of federal and state
gasoline and diesel taxes to retail prices, focusing on the dependence of the shifting on factors
constraining the gasoline and diesel supply chains. They find full pass-through of both state and
federal taxes for both gasoline and diesel in most of their specifications. In addition, the authors
find that the observed pass-through is immediately translated into final prices. Contrary to
our study, none of these papers consider the interplay between the effect of taxes and market
structure explicitly and most of them do not even control for market structure. Indeed, some
papers implicitly (or explicitly) make the assumption of perfectly competitive markets.
The closest study to ours is Sen (2001). The paper investigates the presence of overshifting
in cigarette retail prices using data for 10 Canadian provinces from 1982 to 2002. He focuses
on whether the presence of overshifting can be attributed to signs of collusion in the industry.
The author finds overshifting of provincial taxes but not of federal ones. Moreover, he cannot
attribute the overreaction of prices to provincial taxes directly to collusion. We abstract from
the collusion hypothesis, but focus instead on the interdependence of market structure and tax
incidence which is, once again, absent in Sen’s paper.
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1.3 The gasoline industry and taxes in Canada
The retail gasoline market in Canada is composed of three different categories of firms: major
vertically-integrated, regional and independent firms.6 Vertically-integrated firms such as Petro-
Canada, Shell and Esso conduct crude exploration, production and development operations as
well as downstream refining and retailing, operating at a national level. Regional firms also
conduct integrated upstream and downstream activities but are geographically limited. For
instance, Irving Oil and Ultramar operate in eastern Canada, whereas Husky is located in the
Prairies and the West. Together, majors and regionals account for roughly 80% of all retail
sales. Finally, independent firms (e.g. Cango in Ottawa and Domo in Vancouver) and super
store retailers (Canadian Tire, Real Canadian Superstore, Save on Foods and Costco) do not
own refineries and exclusively conduct downstream retailing.
Retailers considerably decreased during the 1990s from 22, 000 in 1989 to 13, 250 in 2000,
i.e. a reduction of around 40%. Although majors have led the rationalization in terms of
retail outlets and independents increased their proportion of retail sites, the market share of the
latter ones decreased from 23% in 1990 to 18% in 1999 suggesting an increase in the degree of
market concentration.7 These stylized facts are consistent with the following observation noted
by the Board’s report “the gasoline industry in Canada has a limited number of key players
who, through their vertical integration and sheer size, are often expected to have power in the
marketplace [and] differences in gasoline prices between cities are generally influenced by the
different competitive conditions found at the street level.”8
Finally, as mentioned in the same report, besides the barriers to entry that are usually
present in the gasoline industry (such as economies of scale and capital requirements), costs
to both entering and exiting the retail business considerably increased during the 1990s. New
environmental regulations were implemented increasing the cost of opening a retail outlet and
entry was discouraged by decreasing retail margins throughout most of the decade.
Taxes are the largest component of the pump price in Canada. In 2000, retail gasoline prices
consisted of three major components: taxes, crude oil and a refining/marketing component with
taxes representing, on average, around 42% of the price. Gasoline taxes in Canada can be divided
as follows: federal and provincial excise taxes; the Goods and Services Tax (GST); as well as the
Provincial Sales Taxes (PST), where applicable. The federal excise tax is imposed across Canada
and added on to the other price components of gasoline (crude oil, refining margin and retail
margin). In addition, a similar (excise) tax on gasoline is also levied by provincial governments.
6This section is based on the comprehensive review conducted by The Conference Board of Canada. The
report gives an overview of the industry during the 1980s and 1990s covering the sample period of our analysis.
7See also Sen and Townley (2010).
8The Conference Board of Canada (2001), piii.
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Moreover, the GST is levied on all components of the price of gasoline. All Canadian provinces
pay the GST, although for New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland it is part of the
Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). Quebec is the only province in Canada to explicitly charge a
Provincial Sales Tax (PST). The PST is an ad valorem tax and is calculated on the total cost
of gasoline. Finally, some Canadian cities apply their own transit (flat) taxes on retail gasoline.
To sum up, although roughly 80% of sales belong to national and regional retailers, concen-
tration varies across cities and time likely due to differences in market shares of independent
and super store retailers. Moreover, gasoline is taxed both at the federal and provincial lev-
els. Provinces are completely free to set their taxes, implying significant variation across cities.
Hence, Canada presents an almost ideal setting to test our theory.
To illustrate the variation in our raw data we have divided Canada in four geographical
regions: Eastern Canada, Quebec, Ontario and Western Canada. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
evolution of (final) retail prices for the four regions. All of them show decreasing retail prices
Figure 1.1: Time evolution of prices
Source: The Kent Group
at the beginning of the period and an increasing trend afterwards. Though the inflection year
varies for the different regions, i.e. while final prices in Western Canada started increasing in
1992; in Quebec they started augmenting only in 1995. Moreover, taking the two extremes
of the time line covered by our sample (1991 and 1997), we observe that final prices in both
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Eastern Canada and Ontario remained almost constant while they increased in Western Canada
and diminished in Quebec. In the left panel of Figure 1.2 we display the evolution of market
concentration (measured by the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index, HHI) across the period covered in
our dataset.9 Interestingly, we observe different patterns. The highest concentration is found in
Figure 1.2: Time evolution of market concentration and excise taxes
Source: The Kent Group and own calculations
Eastern Canada with HHI values above 2, 000, although with a slight decrease of concentration
over time. All other regions have witnessed rationalisation over the period, implying increasing
concentration levels. The steepest wave of concentration belongs to Quebec, holding the lowest
levels of market concentration (HHI below 1, 400) at the beginning of the 1990s, but ending up
with an HHI close to 2, 000 by 1997. Both Ontario and Western Canada experienced market
concentration but at lesser rates than Quebec. On the right panel of Figure 1.2 we plot the
evolution of excise taxes (in cents per litre) for the four regions. Taxes have generally increased
9The Hirschmann-Herfindahl Indeces are computed as the sum squared of firm specific market shares
and are a common measure of market concentration used by antitrust agencies such as the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, especially with respect to merger analysis. Hence, a
monopoly would result in an HHI of 10, 000. As detailed in the U.S. Department of Justice’s website
(http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html), antitrust agencies generally consider markets in which
the HHI is between 1, 500 and 2, 500 points to be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI is in
excess of 2, 500 points to be highly concentrated.
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over the period but at differing rates across regions. While Eastern Canada taxed gasoline
at the highest levels in 1991, they were overtaken by Quebec and Ontario subsequently. Also
noteworthy is that the spread of excise taxes has slightly increased over time by roughly one
cent per litre. Figure 1.3 illustrates the relation between final prices and market concentration
(left panel) and excise taxes (right panel). Both variables display a positive effect on prices, as
Figure 1.3: Prices, excise taxes and market concentration
Source: The Kent Group and own calculations
expected. The raw correlation coefficients are 0.27 for market concentration and 0.43 for taxes.
Table 1.1 offers more illustration in the variation on firm specific market shares resulting in
corresponding changes in city specific HHIs. The table explores the impact of rationalization
by documenting firms operating in each city at the sample period end points (1991 and 1007)
and their respective market shares calculated from sales volume and the number of outlets. To
preserve confidentiality, market shares are stated by firm type (major, regional and independent).
Broadly speaking, the table supports the widely held view that rationalization of outlets was
mainly conducted by vertically integrated firms. Specifically, the share of outlets owned by
major vertically integrated firms declined between 1991 and 1997 in many cities, while the
market shares of these firms (measured by sales volumes) actually increased.
8
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Finally, Figure 1.4 illustrates graphically our test. We plot again the relation between taxes
and prices dividing the sample into low and high concentrated markets.10 Further, we fit a
simple regression line through the scatter plot for each type of market. In the graph, our
test corresponds to comparing the slope coefficients of the fitted lines between low and high
concentrated markets (indicated in the figure). We observe that the pass-through of taxes to
final prices is slightly lower for high concentrated markets (0.76) than for low concentrated
ones (0.81). Thus, the effect of taxes on prices decreases with market concentration, suggesting
that the Canadian retail gasoline market undershifts taxes. In the following sections, we intend
Figure 1.4: Prices and taxes for low and highly concentrated markets
Source: The Kent Group and own calculations
to study the relationship between prices, excise taxes and market concentration using formal
econometric models.
10The sample is divided along the median.
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1.4 Data and empirical framework
1.4.1 Data
Our dataset consists of monthly observations for the period 1991 − 1997 of ten of the main
cities in Canada.11 The three main variables are those concerning gasoline prices, taxes and the
gasoline retail market structure. We obtained retail prices (the dependent variable) from the
Weekly Pump Price Survey (WPPS) of MJ Ervin & Associates.12 This is a survey of Tuesday
morning prices for retail gasoline in more than 50 Canadian cities. We use city-level monthly
averages and prices are final pump prices including all taxes.13
Our main tax variable, excise, accounts for federal and provincial excise taxes.14 We use the
standard Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) as our market concentration measure and hence,
as an index of competition.15 There are obvious concerns about using a market wide measure of
competition, as opposed to more local constructs, as is the case with some recent U.S. studies.16
However, there are differences between Canada an the United States. First, a significant portion
of Canada’s population (roughly 80%) lives in urban areas. Second, studies have found a good
11The cities in our database are: Calgary, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Quebec, Saint John, St. Johns, Toronto,
Vancouver and Winnipeg.
12MJ Ervin & Associates is a division of the Kent Group. MJ Ervin & Associates collected data on retail and
wholesale prices from a weekly 38 Canadian City survey reaching over 400 outlets.These data are routinely used
by government as well as industry. For further details, please consult http://www.kentmarketingservices.com/.
It is our understanding that their sample has remained more or less constant over time. Thus, we expect their
computed average price to be an unbiased estimate of the true overall city average price at each point in time.
13Such taxes include the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Since the GST is also applied to excise taxes, one
could argue that using final prices biases our results towards finding overshifting of taxes as any (excise) tax
increase would be multiplied by one plus the GST into final prices. We are not particularly worried about this
issue, mainly because the GST is a level effect and it is not clear that it should affect our coefficient of interest,
namely the interaction of taxes and market structure. We would, indeed, argue that this could be seen as an
advantage of our test.
14We restrict our analysis to variation of provincial and federal excise taxes as the ad valorem sales tax
component, whether in terms of GST, PST or HST is a relatively small portion of final per litre retail prices.
Indeed, our summary statistics show that excise taxes constitute 62% of final retail prices. Nevertheless, as a
robustness check, we also carried out the estimations using two additional tax variables: state that only accounts
for excise taxes at the provincial level and both, a broader tax variable including federal and excise taxes and
the goods and services tax (GST) converted into dollar equivalents. Results do not significantly differ and are
available upon request.
15Again, information on market concentration and the number of stations was obtained from The Kent Group
that provides this information from all outlets in the markets it surveys. There might be valid concerns if the
number of outlets surveyed is limited, which would result in a biased estimate of firm specific market shares. How-
ever, ober our sample period, The Kent Group collected data from over 8, 000 retail outlets. Our understanding
is that almost all outlets are regularly surveyed for each of the cities in our sample.
16See, for example, Lewis (2008).
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deal of uniformity of gasoline prices within Canadian cities, which is consistent with the presence
of a large commuter population.17 In other words, while rational drivers should not be willing
to drive large distances to search for slightly lower gasoline prices, the marginal cost of such a
search is low if they happen to drive between home and work and are able to observe differences
in gasoline prices during their journey. Third, informal conversations with operators of outlets
affiliated with vertically integrated firms, suggest that local affiliates have in most cases, very
little or no discretion at all in setting retail prices, which are set by the regional office of the
firm. Further, the consensus was that retail prices are uniform within cities.
We include a number of control variables as well. Gasoline wholesale prices and the number
of gasoline stations control for supply-side characteristics. The wholesale price is also reported
in the WPPS and is highly correlated with crude oil price suggesting that it captures both
the effects from the Canadian wholesale and the international crude oil markets. Thus, we
decided not to include crude oil price as a regressor. Finally, we also control for demand side
aspects by including per capita gasoline consumption, average income at the provincial level
and demographic controls (provincial unemployment rates, population, percentage of youths
between 15 and 24 years old). Table 1.2 presents summary statistics.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable Units N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Final retail price including taxes ¢/litre 840 56.05 5.13 38.67 72.93
State excise tax ¢/litre 840 12.78 2.30 7 16.5
Federal and State excise taxes ¢/litre 840 21.89 2.52 15.5 26.5
Herfindahl Hirschiman Index 0-10.000 840 1766.7 440.5 1196.1 3051.4
Wholesale price of gasoline ¢/litre 840 23.29 2.88 15.24 37.9
Per capita consumption of gasoline litres (in 1.000) 840 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.50
Total number of stations 1.000 840 0.34 0.35 0.05 1.42
Population 100.000 840 13.22 13.37 1.28 44.99
Prop. population aged 15-24 % 840 14.00 1.74 9.30 19.27
Unemployment rate % 840 11.39 3.28 5.4 21.5
Average annual income C$ (in 1.000) 840 44.71 6.69 33.8 55.8
Share of seats pol. party in power % 840 65.71 9.46 52 87.27
Both lib. in power Dummy 840 0.32 0.47 0 1
Both conserv. in power Dummy 840 0.60 0.24 0 1
17See The Conference Board of Canada (2001).
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1.4.2 Empirical framework
We estimate the following model:
Priceit = β0 + β1Exciseit + β2HHIit + β3Exciseit ∗HHIit +X′itβ + it, (1.1)
where Priceit denotes retail prices including taxes in city i at year t. Exciseit accounts for both
federal and provincial excise taxes, HHIit is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and Xit is the set
of control variables described above.18
Let us now briefly give the flavor of the theoretical background behind our model.19 We
base the the introduction of the interaction term between tax rates and market structure on a
simple Cournot oligopoly model such as the one developed in Besley (1989). The standard tax
incidence condition derived in previous tax incidence models shows that the effect of taxes on
prices, in general, depends on market structure (proxied by the number of firms in the industry,
N) as follows:
∂p
∂τ
= N
N + (η + k)

< 1 ⇒ undershifting
= 1 ⇒ full shifting
> 1 ⇒ overshifting
(1.2)
where, following Seade (1980), we define η = Qp
′′
p′ as the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand and k = 1− c
′′
p′ represents the relative slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves.
20
As we can observe from equation (), while N affects the degree of the shifting, the sign of (η+k)
tells us whether we are in presence of under- or overshifting. Moreover, by taking the derivative
of the tax incidence condition with respect to N (for given values of η and k), we get:
∂
(
∂p
∂τ
)
∂N
= (η + k)(η +N + k)2 (1.3)
The sign of equation (1.3) equals the sign of (η + k) which, at the same time, determines the
under- overshifting condition. Interestingly, the empirical counterpart of this cross-derivative is
an interaction term of tax rates and market structure in a regression equation.
Now, as is usual in an empirical context, market structure is often characterized by a concen-
tration measure, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is an inverse function of
N . Therefore, the interaction term of taxes with a concentration measure indicates the opposite
18In order to simplify the interpretation of the estimates, we re-scale HHI between 0 and 1.
19The theoretical background is formally derived in the Appendix.
20Standard tax incidence notation is used. Thus, p is the consumer price, q is the output of a given symmetric
firm and Q ≡ Nq denotes the total output of the industry. Finally, τ is an excise tax on q and c(q) is the cost
function.
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sign of (η + k) which, in turn, determines whether taxes are under- or overshifted to consumer
prices.
This is, in a few lines, the theoretical background behind our test. The main feature of
this empirical test is that it will allow the econometrician to assess whether taxes are under- or
overshifted in a particular market based on observables. Indeed, in a price-regression framework
the sign of the coefficient of the interaction term between taxes and market concentration will
inform about tax incidence. If the interaction term has a negative coefficient taxes are under-
shifted, while if its sign is positive taxes are overshifted. An empirical application of our test
is straightforward and requires variation in taxes and market structure in the relevant product
market.
This is relevant, because, to our knowledge, no study of tax incidence in oligopolistic markets
has included this specific interaction term (β3); not even those that do control for market
structure. To say it differently, previous studies on tax incidence measure the effect of taxes on
prices through the coefficient β1. Similarly, in these models, β2 measures the effect of market
concentration on retail prices. In our case, β1 measures the direct pass-through effect of taxes
under perfect competition, i.e. when HHI = 0 and β2 accounts for the direct effect of market
structure on prices when no tax is applied. We thus expect β1 to be equal to 1 and β2 to be
positive. Finally, our main coefficient of interest is β3, the coefficient of the interaction term
that measures the effect of market concentration on the degree of tax shifting. Its empirical sign
indicates whether we are in presence of under- or overshifting.
Inference
Our basic specifications present robust standard errors. However, it could be warranted to allow
for other standard errors structures. A typical issue when working with time series (or panel
data) is the presence of serial correlation. Newey-West standard errors allow the error structure
to be heteroskedastic and possibly autocorrelated up to some lag. Another strategy in the same
direction is to fit the model using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). This strategy
allows for the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation
and heteroskedasticity across panels.
Another possibility is to allow the error terms to be correlated within clusters. Clustering
at the city level and computing cluster-robust standard errors seems straight forward in our
model. Indeed, as it has been shown by Moulton (1990), the estimation of the covariance
matrix without controlling for clustering can lead to understated standard errors and overstated
statistical significance.21 Under the usual assumptions, the OLS estimator is unbiased in small
samples and normally distributed or consistent and approximately normally distributed when
21See also Moulton (1986), Wooldridge (2003) and Stock and Watson (2008) among others.
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we work with a large number of clusters. In other words, the cluster-robust covariance matrix
is consistent when the number of clusters tends to infinity. However, we are working with only
10 clusters. Thus the standard procedures for clustering might not be valid. An alternative is
the application of the wild bootstrap method applied in Cameron et al. (2008).
Endogeneity
One could argue that two potential issues of endogeneity exist in our analysis. First, higher
prices could encourage entry and thus impact market structure. Therefore, market concentration
may be endogenous to prices. Second, coefficient estimates of the effects of taxes may be
confounded because of simultaneity bias between taxes and prices. In other words, tax setting
authorities might adjust tax rates given current prices. As such, we perform instrumental
variables regression.
First, concerning market structure, we can expect Pit and HHIit to be correlated but it is
less likely that Priceit and HHIit−1 or HHIit−2 are. Thus, we use the one- and two-periods
lagged value of HHIit as an instrument for market structure. Similarly, following the strategy
implemented by Besley and Case (2000), we instrument taxes with the political party in power
at the provincial level. Specifically, we use data on the share of seats of the political party in
power in each province and an indicator whether the political party in power is the same at
both the federal and provincial levels. The idea behind our strategy is that political parties may
influence the set of policies to be implemented (including taxation) without having any direct
relationship with retail prices.
1.5 Estimation and results
1.5.1 Preliminary results
We start in Table 1.3 repeating, with our sample, what has currently been done in the literature,
i.e. we estimate equation (1.1) without the interaction term.
In column (1) we include city-specific fixed effects, while in column (2) we add quarterly
dummies to capture seasonality. In column (3) we also include an overall time trend. Finally, in
column (4) we omit the city level fixed effects and the overall time trend but allow for city-specific
time trends. The overall fit of our model is good with R2 of around 0.75.
Regarding the control variables, we observe that wholesale prices are an important determi-
nant of retail prices. An increase of the wholesale price of 10 cents raises final prices by roughly
7 cents. Also, the impact of wholesale is rather persistent. The lagged value is still positive and
highly significant, while the coefficient of the second lag is negative. The socio-economic controls
reveal the expected signs. The unemployment rate, an indicator of the economic situation of the
15
Table 1.3: No interaction term - OLS and fixed effects estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excise 0.180* 0.188** 0.256** 0.182*
[0.0954] [0.0955] [0.124] [0.0957]
HHI -5.199 -5.205 -5.798 -5.107
[7.802] [7.745] [7.661] [7.743]
Wholesale 0.669*** 0.640*** 0.644*** 0.639***
[0.0734] [0.0785] [0.0791] [0.0785]
Wholesale_lag1 0.562*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 0.540***
[0.111] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113]
Wholesale_lag2 -0.241*** -0.225*** -0.229*** -0.225***
[0.0847] [0.0833] [0.0833] [0.0833]
Unemployment rate -0.311*** -0.326*** -0.356*** -0.324***
[0.116] [0.114] [0.120] [0.114]
Population 0.488** 0.542*** 0.571*** 0.555***
[0.192] [0.193] [0.192] [0.195]
Prop. aged 15 to 24 -0.221* -0.218* -0.264* -0.214*
[0.131] [0.130] [0.136] [0.130]
Stations 9.856*** 10.54*** 9.698*** 10.40***
[3.170] [3.250] [3.413] [3.192]
Gasoline cons. pp -0.602 -1.785 -1.493 -1.866
[3.062] [3.009] [3.034] [3.009]
Average income 0.226** 0.235*** 0.236*** 0.236***
[0.0888] [0.0866] [0.0866] [0.0866]
City FE YES YES YES NO
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES
Time trend NO NO YES NO
City Specific Time trend NO NO NO YES
Observations 820 820 820 820
R2 0.7433 0.7468 0.7471 0.7467
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is final retail gasoline
price. Standard errors based on robust covariance matrices in brackets. R2 overall where
applicable.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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city, reduces prices, as does a higher share of young. Population instead increases prices, likely
due to increased driving distances and levels of congestion in larger cities. Similarly, average
income has a positive and significant effect on prices.
Of the supply side variables, only the number of stations has a significant effect on prices.
Slightly contrary to expectations, a higher number of stations raises gas prices. We presume
that this result is driven by the fact that larger cities have more stations but also higher demand.
Regarding our main coefficients of interest it is interesting to note that market concentration
does not seem to affect retail prices as expected. The coefficient of HHI is negative but not
statistically significant, suggesting that these specifications might be biased.
More importantly, excise exerts a positive and significant (at least at the 10%-level) effect
on prices across all specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient is rather small. Taking
the coefficient of column (3), an increase in excise of ten cents raises the final price by roughly
2.5 cents. Evaluated at the mean this implies an elasticity of prices with respect to excise of
0.07. These results suggest that we are in presence of undershifting and that retail prices react
actually quite little to changes in taxes. However, these results do not take into account the
possibility that the degree of tax shifting might vary with market concentration, to which we
now turn.
1.5.2 Main results
Table 1.4 shows our main results. The specifications in column (1) to (4) are the same as in
Table 1.3.
All the control variables have the identical signs and similar magnitudes. Again, only gaso-
line consumption is not statistically significant. Hence we will not discuss controls again and
concentrate on our main coefficients.
The direct effect of excise taxes on final prices is, statistically significant and positive in all
the specifications. Further, the magnitude of the coefficient varies very little across specifications
and is around 1.3. This implies, taking the coefficient values of column (3), that under perfect
competition (HHI = 0) a 10 cent increase in excise is associated with a 13.5 cent raise in prices.
Thus, the results suggest overshifting of taxes even in competitive markets, which is contrary
to theory. However, in none of the specifications we can reject that the main effect of excise is
actually equal to one, i.e. that taxes are fully shifted when HHI = 0, as indicated in the last
row of Table 1.4, where we test for β1 = 1.22
Similarly, the direct effect of market structure on prices is statistically significant and posi-
tive, as expected. Again, the magnitude of the coefficient is robust across specifications and is
22An interpretation of β1 > 1 could come from the fact that we are estimating out of sample, since we do not
observe values of HHI close to 0 in our sample (see Table 1.2).
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Table 1.4: Main results - OLS and fixed effects estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excise 1.361*** 1.304*** 1.348*** 1.311*** 1.772*** 2.752**
[0.343] [0.340] [0.357] [0.340] [0.384] [1.297]
HHI 127.6*** 120.4*** 118.5*** 121.9*** 134.1*** 228.0*
[39.18] [38.96] [38.69] [38.93] [41.34] [122.2]
Excise_HHI -6.264*** -5.924*** -5.859*** -5.993*** -6.934*** -10.21*
[1.793] [1.793] [1.782] [1.793] [1.908] [5.806]
Wholesale 0.691*** 0.663*** 0.666*** 0.663*** 0.504*** 1.484
[0.0732] [0.0784] [0.0790] [0.0783] [0.0943] [0.937]
Wholesale_lag1 0.547*** 0.527*** 0.527*** 0.527*** 0.552*** -0.355
[0.111] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.126] [0.727]
Wholesale_lag2 -0.204** -0.191** -0.194** -0.190** -0.320***
[0.0875] [0.0858] [0.0856] [0.0858] [0.0891]
Unemployment rate -0.241** -0.259** -0.284** -0.256** -0.432*** 0.0987
[0.120] [0.118] [0.123] [0.118] [0.153] [0.809]
Population 0.462** 0.516*** 0.540*** 0.529*** 0.477** -2.197
[0.198] [0.199] [0.197] [0.201] [0.204] [4.996]
Prop. aged 15 to 24 -0.271** -0.265** -0.302** -0.261** -0.323** -1.014
[0.134] [0.133] [0.139] [0.133] [0.147] [0.743]
Stations 11.17*** 11.76*** 11.05*** 11.63*** 9.068*** 7.000
[3.270] [3.324] [3.463] [3.264] [3.252] [9.637]
Gasoline cons. pp -1.028 -2.124 -1.880 -2.200 -1.594 54.81
[3.012] [2.969] [2.992] [2.968] [3.284] [179.1]
Average income 0.274*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.216** -0.132
[0.0872] [0.0856] [0.0855] [0.0856] [0.100] [0.371]
City FE YES YES YES NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES NO NO
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
City-Month FE NO NO NO NO YES NO
Time trend NO NO YES NO NO NO
City Specific Time trend NO NO NO YES NO NO
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 60
R2 0.7474 0.7505 0.7507 0.7505 0.7923 0.8976
Test full shifting 1.10 0.80 0.95 0.83 4.04 1.83
0.2933 0.3717 0.3297 0.3613 0.0444 0.1765
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is final retail gasoline price. Standard errors
based on robust covariance matrices in brackets. R2 overall where applicable.
Columns 1 to 5, based on monthly data. Column 6, based on yearly data.
Test for full shifting under perfect competition (excise = 1): χ2 statistic above and P values below.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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around 120. Thus, an increase in HHI of 0.1 implies a raise in prices of roughly 12 cents.23
Most importantly, the degree of tax shifting depends largely on market structure. Indeed, the
coefficient of the interaction term between excise and HHI is negative and highly statistically
significant. Again, its magnitude is robust across specifications and fluctuates around −6. This
is quite an important effect. Evaluated at the mean of HHI (= 0.18) our results imply that a 10
cent increase in taxes is associated with a raise of 3.0 cents in final prices, a tremendous difference
from the degree of tax shifting under perfect competition (13.5). Incidentally, the average effect
of excise is slightly higher than the one estimated in the model without the interaction term
(= 0.25). We return to the interpretation of the results in Section 1.5.4.
Based on our test, the negative sign of the interaction term between taxes and market
concentration lets us conclude that excise taxes are undershifted in the Canadian retail gasoline
market.
Finally, one could argue that our results are driven by the unit of observation, which is the
city-month. This corresponds to the variation we observe for the HHI. Thus, we aggregated
the weekly prices we avail of. It could be suspected that both market concentration and excise
taxes vary little from month to month and that our coefficients are essentially identified on the
cross-section dimension. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.3 show that this is not the case. In
column (5) we included year fixed effects and a full subset of city-month fixed effects. Our
results, do not change qualitatively. However, this is not our preferred specification, as we reject
the null hypothesis of β1 = 1.24
Finally, in column (6) we go in the other direction and estimate our model using yearly
instead of monthly averages. Again, results do not change qualitatively although we, quite
obviously, loose statistical precision.25
1.5.3 Robustness checks
We performed a battery of robustness checks of our main results. Table 1.5 presents alternative
specifications of the error structure.
Column (1) repeats the results from column (3) in Table 1.4, which we take as our base
specification for the robustness checks. In column (2) we use a random effects model. The next
two columns address potential issues of autocorrelation. In column (3) we allow for Newey-West
23Recall that HHI in the estimation is re-scaled between 0 and 1. Hence, an increase in HHI of 0.1 represents
a 1, 000 point increase in the usual scale.
24Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients of column (5) is larger for all main coefficients. By preferring
the specification in column (3) we also take a somewhat conservative approach for discussion of results.
25Further, inspection of Figure 1.1, with the u-shaped evolution of prices could call for a break in the time
trend. We estimated our model with a break in 1994, allowing for differential trends in these two periods. Results
do not change and are available upon request.
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Table 1.5: Robustness checks - Inference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excise 1.348*** 1.187*** 1.209** 1.469*** 1.348 1.187*
[0.357] [0.218] [0.475] [0.324] [0.847] [0.676]
HHI 118.5*** 93.04*** 106.2** 131.5*** 118.5 93.04
[38.69] [24.37] [53.81] [37.37] [83.40] [72.66]
Excise_HHI -5.859*** -3.871*** -5.224** -6.422*** -5.859 -3.871
[1.782] [1.229] [2.471] [1.702] [4.608] [3.934]
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster (City) NO NO NO NO YES YES
City FE YES NO YES YES YES NO
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 820 820 840 820 820 820
R2 0.7507 0.7025 0.497
Test full shifting 0.95 0.74 0.19 2.10 0.17 0.08
0.3297 0.3904 0.6594 0.1474 0.6906 0.7822
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is final retail gasoline price.
Standard errors in brackets. R2 overall where applicable.
Column 1 reproduces column 3 in Table 3, our main specification.
Column 2, based on robust covariance matrices.
Column 3, based on Newey-West standard errors. The lagged values of Wholesale (Wholesale_lag1
and Wholesale_lag2) are excluded because the Newey-West specification has already been computed
considering 2 lags in the autocorrelation structure.
Column 4, feasible GLS.
Columns 5, FE, clustered standard errors at the city level.
Columns 6, RE, clustered standard errors at the city level.
Test for full shifting under perfect competition (excise = 1): χ2 (for columns 1, 2, 4 and 6) and
F-statistics (for columns 3 and 5) above and P values below.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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standard errors. Note that in this specification we did not include the lagged values of the
wholesale price. Next, in column (4) we estimate a feasible GLS model.
Our results are robust to these alternative specifications and confirm our result that taxes
are undershifted. In all of them excise taxes and market concentration exert a positive and
significant impact on gasoline prices, while the interaction between these two variables is negative
and highly statistically significant. Further, one can note that the magnitude of the effects is
also fairly stable across specifications. The lowest magnitudes are obtained in the random effects
model. Finally, in none of the specifications we reject the test of full tax shifting under perfect
competition (last row of the table).
In columns (5) and (6) we cluster standard errors at the city-level. As mentioned before,
this strategy seems straightforward. In column (5) we use city fixed effects, while in column (6)
we use a random effects model.
Note that, when clustering standard errors, we loose statistical significance, except for excise
in the random effects model.26 However, as discussed above, given that we work with a very
small number of clusters (10), clustering techniques might not be adequate in our situation.
Hence, we prefer our main results from Table 1.4.
In Table 1.6 we turn to the possible endogeneity issues as described in Subsection 1.4.2.
We instrument excise with the share of seats of the political party in power in each province
and a dummy indicating whether the political party in power is the same at both the federal
and provincial levels. Market structure is instrumented with two lags of HHI. The first three
columns are based on FE-2SLS whereas columns (4) to (6) replicate the same specifications
under a RE-2SLS approach.
In columns (1) and (4), we only instrument HHI, while in columns (2) and (5) we only
instrument the tax variable, excise. Finally, in columns (3) and (6), we tackle both endogeneity
issues at the same time instrumenting both excise and HHI.
Our set of instruments performs quite well in terms of weak instruments. We compute a
Weak Identification Test following Stock and Yogo (2002).27 For columns (1), (2), (4) and
(5); where only one endogenous variable is considered at the time, we provide the 1st-stage
F-statistic. In all the four specifications the F-statistic is larger than 10 suggesting that we are
not in presence of weak instruments. In columns (3) and (6), where we consider two endogenous
variables silmutaneously, we provide the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic to be compared with
the values given by Stock and Yogo (2002). In column (3), we reject the null that the set of
26Using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure to improve inference while working with few clusters, we find
the following p-values: Under the FE approach; 0.25375, 0.26873 and 0.34466 for excise, HHI and the interaction
term respectively. Under the RE approach the values are the following ones: 0.32068, 0.44555 and 0.69630 for
excise, HHI and the interaction term respectively.
27See also Hausman et al. (2005) and Baum et al. (2003).
21
Table 1.6: Robustness checks - IV-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excise 1.797*** 8.830*** 9.088*** 1.319*** 3.249*** 3.345***
[0.589] [1.893] [1.960] [0.316] [1.013] [1.016]
HHI 171.7** 867.6*** 897.7*** 108.5*** 314.2*** 324.5***
[66.28] [195.6] [204.2] [36.18] [108.9] [109.2]
Excise_HHI -8.281*** -41.32*** -42.70*** -4.635** -14.78*** -15.28***
[3.018] [9.119] [9.499] [1.805] [5.376] [5.392]
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES NO NO NO
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 820
R2 0.742 0.589 0.579 0.696 0.670 0.668
Test full shifting 1.83 17.12 17.03 1.02 4.93 5.33
0.1759 0.0000 0.0000 0.3137 0.0265 0.0209
Sargan Test 3.157 6.935 8.036 2.395 7.718 9.590
0.0756 0.0312 0.0453 0.1217 0.0211 0.0224
Weak identif.test 160.77 13.24 7.93 380.62 18.82 11.34
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is final retail gasoline price. Standard
errors in brackets in brackets. R2 overall where applicable.
Columns 1, 2 and 3, with FE-2SLS. Columns 4, 5 and 6, with RE-2SLS.
Columns 1 and 4: HHI instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus lagged values of HHI (HHIt−1
and HHIt−2).
Columns 2 and 5: Excise instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus the share of seats of the political
party in power in each province and a dummy indicating whether the political party in power is the same
at both the federal and state levels.
Columns 3 and 6: Both excise and HHI instrumented using the instruments mentioned above.
Test for fully shifting under perfect competition (excise = 1): χ2 above and P values below.
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions: χ2 above and P values below.
Weak identification test: 1st-stage F-statistic except for columns 3 and 6 where we provide the Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistic to be compared with the values given by Stock and Yogo (2002).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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instruments is weak at a 20% maximal IV relative bias.28 In column (6), we can reject the null
that the set of instruments is weak at a 10% maximal IV relative bias.
Things are slightly more problematic in terms of the exogeneity condition. As it can be
observed from Table 1.6, the Sargan test is passed when we only instrument for market structure.
But, the exogeneity test is not passed once we instrument excise. We attribute this result to
the fact that we have fairly little variation in our instruments for taxes. Not only is the political
situation in the different provinces fairly stable over time but, additionally, political variables do
not change over the electoral cycle (usually four years in Canada). Thus, the short time period
we avail of implies we are not able to identify the coefficients with sufficient precision.
Nevertheless, turning to our main coefficients, we can observe that across all instrumented
specifications our main coefficients remain statistically significant and with the expected signs.
Hence, instrumenting confirms the result of our test that excise taxes are undershifted in the
market under study.29 Nevertheless, as it is often the case, the FE-2SLS estimates are bigger
than the FE-OLS ones. This is particularly the case when we instrument for excise. Indeed,
when instrumenting for taxes in a fixed effect framework (columns (2) and (3)), our coefficients
literally explode while remaining with the expected signs.
1.5.4 Discussion of results
What do our results imply? In this subsection we briefly discuss four points we consider partic-
ularly relevant: i) model specification; ii) policy conclusions; iii) generality of our test; and iv)
welfare implications.30
We first illustrate our results graphically. Figure 1.5 plots the level of tax shifting depending
on market structure. It can be noted that for a large part of concentration values contained
in our sample, tax incidence is statistically significantly less than one.31 Also, one can infer
from the graph that full shifting cannot be rejected for perfectly competitive markets (as we
28It is worth mentioning that, although we do not have other values than the one provided by Stock and Yogo
(2002), we would probably also reject the null at a 15% maximal IV relative bias given that the Cragg-Donald
Wald F-statistic of 7.93 has to be compared with the following values: 10% maximal IV relative bias, 8.78 and
20% maximal IV relative bias, 5.91.
29Following the procedure in Baltagi (2009), we perform two Hausman tests based on the contrast between
the fixed effects and random effects estimators; one before and other after controlling for endogeneity. The idea
is that the result could have changed when applying the 2SLS framework. Nevertheless, in our case, we reject
the null that the RE estimator is consistent in both cases, before and after controlling for endogeneity. Hence,
the FE specification is preferred to the RE one in both Table 1.4 and Table 1.6. We show both the FE and RE
estimations as an additional robustness check.
30Note that the discussion in this section is based on our preferred specification i.e. column (3) in Tables 1.3
and 1.4.
31This is the case for HHI > 1, 450.
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Figure 1.5: Interdependence of tax incidence and market structure
have tested statistically above). Further, the graph nicely illustrates the strong effect market
structure has on tax incidence. Indeed, the estimated effect for concentrated markets turns even
negative at around HHI = 2, 300, although this is never statistically significant.
Let us now turn to our first discussion point. As mentioned above, most empirical appli-
cations of tax incidence in oligopolistic markets did not include the interaction term between
taxes and market structure, although warranted by theory. These models might be inadequately
specified as our results suggest. In our sample, not controlling for the interaction term under-
estimates tax incidence. In column (3) of Table 1.3 the tax coefficient was estimated at around
0.25 while, in our preferred specification, tax incidence at the mean of market concentration is
0.30, i.e. an increase of around 20%.
However, not only tax incidence could be incorrectly estimated, also wrong policy conclusions
could be taken. This takes us to the next discussion point. Taking the model of Table 1.3 one
would conclude that only about 25% of an increase in taxes is passed on to consumers, and
would apply this policy result to all the markets. However, the effective tax incidence varies
greatly across different markets (and hence regions). This is again nicely illustrated in Figure
1.5 above. In our sample, tax incidence varies from 0.65 to (an admittedly implausible) −0.44
between the least and most concentrated markets. More importantly, looking at the inference of
our coefficients, our results suggest that in the least concentrated markets (Ottawa, Montreal,
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Calgary, Winnipeg and Toronto) taxes might actually be fully passed on to consumers, while they
might be fully absorbed by producers in the most concentrated markets (Vancouver, Quebec,
Halifax, St. Johns and Saint John). Obviously, policy conclusions might be quite different under
these two scenarios.
Further, some caution should be applied when interpreting a model that does not include
the interaction term.32 Suppose that estimating a model without the differential effect of taxes
depending on market structure produces a coefficient on excise that is not statistically different
from one. Then, one would conclude that taxes are fully shifted to consumers, confirming the
implicit assumption of a perfectly competitive market.
For example, we think that our findings are relevant to the conclusions drawn by Marion
and Muehlegger (2011), in a recent and important contribution to the sparse literature on tax
incidence. While the main focus of their paper is not on imperfectly competitive markets, but
rather on the effect of capacity constraints on tax incidence, they do estimate price regressions
similar to ours for the U.S. gasoline and diesel markets. In the paper, they estimate a total of
40 pass-through rates. In most cases (in 31 out of 40 regressions) they find coefficient estimates
greater than 1, but not statistically significantly different from 1. They conclude that “... gasoline
and diesel fuel taxes are on average fully... passed on to consumers”.33 However, the authors
do not control for market structure. Given this, our findings raise the possibility that taxes
may be overshifted in the U.S. gasoline and diesel markets. In other words, if one were to
estimate a model controlling for market structure and the interaction term between taxes and
market structure, one were likely to find a positive interaction term. The model by Marion and
Muehlegger (2011) estimates tax incidence essentially at the mean of market structure across
States. The confidence interval of this estimation does not allow them to reject full shifting
leading to the confirmation of a perfectly competitive market. In Figure 1.6 we illustrate this
alternative scenario. Let’s assume taxes are overshifted, hence tax incidence increases with
market concentration. However, the confidence interval of the pass-through rates estimated
at the mean of market concentration might contain one, leading to the potentially incorrect
conclusion of full shifting. It should be finally noted that the policy conclusions might be
different under overshifting. For instance, consumer surplus reduction is larger (even in case of
inelastic demand) and producer profits can increase when taxes are overshifted.
Of course, the above is a possibility which can only be confirmed if access to market structure
data in the U.S. markets are available. However, at the very least, we would argue that our test
complements Marion and Muehlegger (2011) quite nicely, in terms of being a useful instrument
to assess the degree of tax shifting across industries. Indeed, we think that our test can, with
32Although it should be noted that this is not the case in our sample.
33Marion and Muehlegger (2011), p. 1202.
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Figure 1.6: Interdependence of tax incidence and market structure: an alternative scenario
reasonable confidence, measure whether taxes are under- or overshifted in a particular industry.
This is, in our opinion, an important and relevant policy result.
Third, one can easily imagine a more general application of our test. Essentially, a change in
excise taxes is an exogenous (at least for an individual firm) shock to its marginal cost. As such,
our theory could in principle go through for any exogenous cost shock to firms. This idea could
be of interest to antitrust policy, as our test could identify whether exogenous cost shocks are
over- or undershifted to consumers depending on market parameters, rather than say, potential
collusion. We intend to study the potential implications for antitrust policy in future research.
Finally, we can turn to the welfare implications of our findings. Besley (1989) discusses
the welfare effects of commodity taxation in oligopolistic markets. His Proposition 1 (Besley,
1989, p. 366) states that a marginal increase in excise taxes can be welfare improving if E <
0.34 The corresponding expression to Besley’s E in our model is (η + k) .35 Hence, a necessary
condition for marginal tax changes to be welfare improving is that they are passed on less than
proportionally to consumers. This is the case in our sample. Thus marginal increases in excise
taxes in the gasoline market in Canada might be welfare improving. Again, we argue that this
is, particularly in the current policy discussion, an interesting result and should be explored
further in future research.
34It should be noted that the Proposition 1 in Besley (1989) seems to present a typographic error that we take
into account in the text.
35Note that Besley (1989) assumes a constant marginal cost, hence in his model k = 1.
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1.6 Concluding remarks
The Canadian gasoline retail market is concentrated. Thus, the perfect competition assump-
tion might be misleading when analyzing the effect of taxes on prices. In oligopolistic markets,
taxes can be shifted forward less (more) than proportionally to retail prices; a possibility usu-
ally denoted by undershifting (overshifting). Generally, whether there is under- or overshifting
depends on unobservable parameters of the demand and cost functions. In this paper, we devise
an empirical test to assess the degree of tax shifting which is based on observables, namely an
interaction term between taxes and market structure in a price equation.
We apply our test to the Canadian retail gasoline market. In our sample of monthly obser-
vations across 10 cities over the period 1991 − 1997, we find that taxes are undershifted. The
results are remarkably robust to a series of alternative specifications both regarding inference
and instrumenting our main variables.
We would argue that our results improve earlier analysis of tax incidence in oligopolistic
markets in an important direction. Most of earlier studies in concentrated markets (e.g. gasoline
and cigarettes) either explicitly or implicitly assume perfectly competitive markets. We show
that such an estimate of tax incidence might be biased when not specifying the model correctly,
i.e. when not accounting for the interdependence of market structure and taxes. Further, policy
conclusions might be inadequate.
In our data, by not allowing tax incidence to vary with market structure, we find a degree
of pass-through of 0.18. Correctly specifying our model implies a tax incidence, evaluated at
the mean, of 0.30, i.e. an increase of 67%. We also find that the degree of tax shifting depends
heavily on market structure. While for the least concentrated markets we cannot reject that
taxes are fully passed on to consumer prices, for the most concentrated ones taxes might be fully
absorbed by producers. Quite obviously, policy conclusions regarding gasoline taxation might
be quite different and should depend on the degree of concentration.
Our empirical test is easily applicable to other markets and regions. It requires data showing
variation in tax rates and market structure. The Canadian example, where Provinces also set
gasoline taxes, is a good illustration of the applicability. The U.S. might be another good
example, since States tax gasoline and there is likely also considerable variation in market
concentration. Further, our test could have even more general implications and could find its
way into further analysis of tax policy and likely even antitrust issues such as collusion. In
future work, we aim at linking the vast literature on tax competition with the tax incidence
results described in this paper.36 Another interesting issue to explore is whether and how our
36See, for example, Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Devereux et al. (2007) and Brülhart and Jametti (2006)
among others.
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results are affected by the presence of different size firms.37
37See Vigneault and Wen (2002).
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Appendix 1.A Theoretical background
We base our test on a simple Cournot oligopoly model based on Besley (1989) where N firms in
the industry choose their level of output taking prices and taxes as given. Firms are symmetric
and, for simplicity, we take the number of firms as exogenously given, but perform comparative
statics. Finally, we concentrate on the effect of excise taxes, the main tax instrument in our
dataset.38
Let the inverse demand function be:
p(
∑
qi) ≡ p(Q) (1.A.1)
where p is the consumer price, qi is the output of firm i and Q(≡∑ qi ≡ qi +Q−i) denotes the
total output of the industry.39
The profit function of firm i is given by:
pii(qi) = p(qi +Q−i)qi − c(qi)− τqi (1.A.2)
where τ is an excise tax on q and c(qi) is the cost function.
Standard assumptions are imposed in order to assure a stable symmetric Cournot equilib-
rium:
Assumption 1 p(Q) : <+ → <+ is twice continuously differentiable and p′(Q) < 0 for all Q
such that p(Q) > 0.
Assumption 2 c(q) : <+ → <+ is increasing and twice continuously differentiable with c(0) >
0, i.e. all firms face a fixed cost.
Since we are focusing on symmetric equilibria, we can omit the subscripts and derive the
first and second order conditions of the profit maximizing firm:
FOC: p′(Q)q + p(Q)− c′(q)− τ = 0, (1.A.3)
SOC: p′′(Q)q + 2p′(Q)− c′′(q) < 0. (1.A.4)
We can re-express Equation (1.A.4) as:
p′(Q)
N
(η +N +Nk) < 0, (1.A.5)
38The model can be extended in many directions such as allowing for entry into the industry (Besley (1989))
or adding an ad valorem tax (Delipalla and Keen (1992)).
39Q−i denotes the output of the industry produced by all the other firms but firm i.
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where, as defined by Seade (1980), η = Qp
′′
p′ is the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand
and k = 1− c
′′
p′ represents the relative slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves.
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Since p′ < 0, we get the following necessary and sufficient condition for the SOC to hold:
η +N +Nk > 0. (1.A.6)
Now, given symmetric firms:
p(Q) ≡ p(qi +Q−i) ≡ p(Nq), (1.A.7)
plugging Equation (1.A.7) into the FOCs:
p′(Nq)q + p(Nq)− c′(q) = τ. (1.A.8)
Differentiating Equation (1.A.8) with respect to τ and rearranging, we obtain:
∂q
∂τ
= 1
p′(η +N + k) , (1.A.9)
and
∂Q
∂τ
= N
p′(η +N + k) . (1.A.10)
Therefore,
∂p
∂τ
= p′
(
∂Q
∂τ
)
= N
N + (η + k) . (1.A.11)
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition (N → ∞) taxes are fully shifted onto consumers
( ∂p∂τ → 1). As the market gets more concentrated, the degree of shifting ( ∂p∂τ ) moves away from
one (1). Indeed, under monopoly (N → 1 ), the degree of shifting is the largest in absolute value.
Proof 1 Inspection of Equation (1.A.11) immediately proves Proposition 1.
Equation (1.A.11) confirms that, under perfect competition, taxes are fully passed to con-
sumers. Moreover, it shows that
∣∣∣ ∂p∂τ ∣∣∣ − 1 is the largest for N = 1, i.e. under monopoly the
degree of shifting is always the furthest away from one. We can now look at the conditions for
under- respectively overshifting.
Proposition 2 If (η + k) is positive, ∂p∂τ < 1 and the market undershifts taxes. On the other
hand, if (η + k) is negative, ∂p∂τ > 1 and we are in the presence of overshifting.
40We treat η and k as parameters, abstracting from second-order effects of η and τ around equilibrium. Note
that this is indeed the case when working with the two most analyzed functional forms of demand analyzed in
tax incidence literature i.e, linear (η = 0) and constant elasticity (η = − 1+

) demand functions.
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Proof 2 Inspection of Equation (1.A.11) allows us to classify the cases of relevance for our
analysis:
∂p
∂τ
= N
N + (η + k)

< 1 ⇒ undershifting
= 1 ⇒ full shifting
> 1 ⇒ overshifting
Proposition 3 The sign of (η + k) equals the sign of the cross derivative of prices with respect
to taxes and market structure.
Proof 3
∂
(
∂p
∂τ
)
∂N
= (η + k)(η +N + k)2 (1.A.12)
As (η+N +k)2 > 0 for all η, N and k, the sign of Equation (1.A.12) equals the sign of (η+k).
Corollary 1 Let HHI be an inverse function of N . Then,
∂
(
∂p
∂τ
)
∂HHI
' −(η + k)
(N + (η + k))2
.
Proposition 3 and its Corollary summarize the main contribution of our paper. As mentioned
in Proposition 2, the sign of (η + k) tells us whether we are in presence of under- or overshifting.
Both η and k depend on the underlying parameters of the demand and cost functions and are
therefore unobservable or inherently difficult to estimate. However, Proposition 3 shows that
the sign of the cross-derivative of prices with respect to taxes (τ) and the number of firms
(N) is equal to the sign of (η + k). The empirical counterpart of this cross-derivative is an
interaction term of taxes and market structure in a regression equation. Now, as is usual in
an empirical context, market structure is often characterized by a concentration measure, such
as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is an inverse function of N . The Corollary
shows that the interaction term of taxes with a concentration measure indicates the opposite
sign of (η + k).
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Chapter 2
Corporate Flat Tax Reforms and
Firms’ Location Choices. Evidence
from Switzerland
2.1 Introduction
The effect of fiscal policies on investment decisions has been studied in several sub-fields of
economics such as industrial organization, economic geography and public economics.1 This
paper focuses on a particular investment made by the entrepreneur: firms’ location choices.
Fiscal policy is crucial for firms deciding where to settle and there are several channels
through which the impact of fiscal policy can make a given jurisdiction more or less attractive
for the entrepreneur.2 Taxation is probably the most important one but the provision of public
goods by local governments has an important impact on corporate location decisions as well.3
The most relevant taxes regarding corporate location choices are the ones levied on profits
and capital. In this paper, we concentrate on the former. Specifically, we aim at estimating the
impact of a corporate flat tax reform on the attractiveness of a given jurisdiction for firms.
Our identification strategy is straightforward. We apply a differences-in-differences approach
to estimate the impact of the reform (decided at the cantonal level) on the attractiveness of
1See, for example, Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977) and Cummins et al. (1996).
2In an important contribution to this literature, Carlton (1983) assesses the impact of fiscal policy on both
location and employment decisions of new firms. He introduced the estimation of corporate location choices
through the conditional-logit model (which is formally derived from a representative firm’s stochastic profit
function) and was among the first to study new business location. For more recent references see, for example,
Barrios et al. (2012) and Devereux and Griffith (1998). For papers studying firm’s location decisions using Swiss
data, see Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) and Brülhart et al. (2012).
3See, for example, Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) and Becker et al. (2012).
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Swiss local jurisdictions. Interestingly, our data allow us to to control for potential confounding
factors such as the level effect by controlling for the average corporate tax rate, and by applying
a number of fixed effects.
Our results suggest that replacing a graduated rate tax (GRT) scheme with a flat rate tax
(FRT) system has a negative and statistically significant effect on the number of firms.4 On
average, firms tend to prefer to settle in municipalities located in cantons where a corporate
GRT schedule is applied. The interpretation of our estimates goes through the insurance effect.
Bacher and Brülhart (2013) have defined this effect as follows: "Keeping the expected after-
tax profits constant, progressive taxation reduces the variance of profits by more than linear
taxation. As a consequence, tax progressivity serves as an insurance device: in bad times, an
entrepreneur has to pay less than under a flat tax, whereas in good times the tax bill is higher."
(Bacher and Brülhart (2013) p., 134).5 In other words, given the reduction in the progressivity
of corporate taxes generated by the flat tax reforms applied in Switzerland (see Section 2.3),
the insurance effect arises as a potential explanation of the observed negative impact on the the
number of firms.
This is an interesting result for several reasons. First it allows us to shed some light on the
effects of corporate flat tax reforms, a particular reform that has been hardly assessed in previous
empirical studies (See Section 2.2). Moreover, our results confirm the presence of the insurance
effect in Switzerland that was previously found in Bacher and Brülhart (2013) using different
data and a different identification strategy as well. In addition, our findings have important
policy implications. Despite the negative impact of flattening corporate taxes on the number
of firms, there has been an increasing number of Swiss cantons introducing flat corporate taxes
since 1990. Even if this effect is small in magnitude, the reduction of the tax base in those
jurisdictions applying such a reform should be considered by policy makers. Finally, in Section
2.6.3 we find that the negative impact of introducing a FRT is particularly strong for small firms.
Policy makers might also want to take this into consideration when (for example) assessing the
redistributive effects of a flat tax reform.
To sum up, our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, by
estimating the effects of a flat tax reform using a differences-in-differences approach, it makes
a step forward in order to close the existing gap between rhetoric argumentation and empirical
evidence.6 In addition, we specifically asses the impact of introducing a flat tax reform on
4Graduated tax schemes are often called progressive. Though, this denomination might lead to misunder-
standings. As we will discuss later in this paper, a GRT is not necessarily more progressive than a FRT. Under
certain conditions, a flat tax system can indeed be more progressive than a GRT.
5Other papers discussing the insurance effect are Cullen and Gordon (2006) and Cullen and Gordon (2007).
6"A notable and troubling feature of discussion of the flat tax is that it has been marked more by rhetoric
and assertion than by analysis and evidence." (Keen et al. (2008), p., 713)
36
corporate taxes which has been largely disregarded with respect to personal income reforms.
Finally, as we will discuss in next sections, flat tax reforms have several potential effects.7 Our
paper focuses on the impact on corporate location decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this
has not been studied before as an outcome of flat tax reforms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the existing literature
in the field. Section 2.3 presents a brief description of the fiscal context in Switzerland showing
the features that make the Swiss Federation an almost ideal setting to develop our study. In
Section 2.4 we describe the data set. Section 2.5 describes the empirical framework and main
estimation issues. In Section 2.6 we present and discuss our results and, finally, in Section 2.7
we provide some concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature background and context
Tax reforms have been largely studied in public economics literature.8 This paper studies the
impact of taxes on firms’ location choices by assessing the effects of a specific reform on the tax
schedule: a flat tax reform. Strictly speaking, "only a flat rate tax without any tax relief is a
"pure" flat tax as in this case the share of tax payments to income is constant for the whole income
range." (Paulus and Peichl (2009) p., 622). As it is nicely described by Keen et al. (2008), the
term "flat tax" was originally associated with Hall and Rabushka (1984) and Hall and Rabushka
(1987).9 However, the flat tax concept has evolved from this precisely defined structure to a
vaguer definition and flat tax reforms can actually differ from case to case. Indeed, most of flat
tax reforms include both the flattening of personal and corporate income taxes. Some of them,
also introduce changes in capital taxes and in the most extreme cases (such as the Slovakia’s
reform of 2004) even modifications on the VAT structure are also applied.10
This lack of unanimity in the definition is also reflected in the heterogeneity among the
countries applying either GRT or FRT schemes. For instance; Japan, the United States and
the United Kingdom rise graduate federal corporate income taxes. On the other hand, Canada,
7For instance, some papers discuss optimality issues related to these reforms (Diamond (1998); Keen et al.
(2008)). Some study the improvements in compliance or the reduction in tax evasion (Andreoni et al. (1998);
Hindriks et al. (1999)). Others, for example, focus on the growth impact of such a reform (Cassou and Lansing
(2004); Stokey and Rebelo (1995)).
8See, for instance, Feldstein (1976), Auerbach and Hines (1988) and Auerbach (1992).
9The flat tax à la Hall and Rabushka is a consumption-type, origin-based value-added tax (VAT) supplemented
by a (nonrefundable) tax credit against labor income. In other words, "their proposal is for a very precisely defined
and coherent tax structure: a combination of a cash-flow tax on business income and a tax on workers’ income,
both levied at the same, single rate (with a personal allowance available against the wage tax)." (Keen et al.
(2008), p., 713− 714).
10For more details on the Slovakia’s flat tax reform, see for example, Brook and Leibfritz (2005) and Moore
(2005).
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France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland apply flat-rate corporate taxes. Interestingly,
when considering different tiers of government in a federation, both systems might coexist. This
is the case in the United States and Switzerland. While in the former 31 states levy flat-rate
corporate income taxes and 17 apply a GRT (the remaining three states do not tax profits); in
Switzerland, cantons have been switching from graduate to flat tax schedules and, nowadays,
17 cantons (out of 26) apply FRT on profits.
Moreover, when it comes to assessing the impact of flattening corporate tax rates, the com-
plexity of these reforms makes the data collection process and the definition of a neat identi-
fication strategy particularly difficult. For instance, one might be concerned about correctly
disentangling the effects of flatness in itself and the level effect when empirically estimating the
impact of such a reform. Keen et al. (2008) have put it as as follows: "The second wave “flat tax”
reforms that have attracted so much attention have generally involved not only a flattening of
the PIT but also a substantial reduction in rates (both average and marginal) in the upper part
of the income distribution. Much of the flat tax rhetoric seems to be concerned more with the
latter than with flatness in itself. There is, of course, a voluminous literature on the behavioral
and revenue effects of tax rate changes. The consequences of flatness per se, however, have
received little analytical attention." (Keen et al. (2008) p., 719).
For all these reasons, there exists a (sometimes misleading) conventional wisdom concerning
FRT schemes. Let us highlight two ideas often accepted as true that are particularly relevant
for our study: i) flat tax reforms necessarily reduce the level of progressivity (with respect to the
GRT scheme that was previously in place) and ii) flat tax reforms only concern personal income.
Both statements are false. We tackle the former point later in this section by giving some of the
main references in the field. Moreover, in Section 2.3, we briefly describe the implications of the
theoretical framework developed by Davies and Hoy (2002) showing that a (personal income) flat
tax reform can either increase or decrease the progressivity level of the tax system. Regarding
the second point, this might be one of the reasons explaining the considerable larger (theoretical
and empirical) literature on personal income flat tax reforms with respect to flat tax reforms
on corporate taxes. Therefore, although the scope of this paper is on profit taxation, we start
by reviewing the literature on personal income reforms and, then, move to the (considerably
smaller) literature assessing corporate flat tax reforms.
2.2.1 Personal income flat tax reforms
Personal income GRT and FRT schemes have been studied in public finance since many years.
Already in the 50s, Blum and Harry Kalven (1952) stated: "Progressive taxation is now regarded
as one of the central ideas of modern democratic capitalism and is widely accepted as a secure
policy commitment which does not require serious examination. The single topic of this essay
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is the extent to which progressive taxation can be justified." (Blum and Harry Kalven (1952),
p., 417).11 Nevertheless, whether the optimal tax schedule should be a GRT or a FRT is still
an opened question.
Moreover, this is an issue with important policy implications and, thus, the choice between
these two tax systems has long been the subject of contentious political (and public) debate. In
1986, the Congress of the United States approved the biggest tax code overhaul in the nation’s
history.12 As mentioned by the former Reagan’s White House adviser, B. Bartlett, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 was probably approved because "...was really a coming together of the liberal
idea of getting rid of tax loopholes with the conservative idea of flattening the tax rates...and so
each side felt that they had something to gain by the effort."13. More recently, an opinion article
published on the Wall Street Journal makes the following question "...(democrats) want to get
rid of the deductions and raise tax rates at the same time. When has that ever worked?"14
In a federation such as the United States, the debate also seems to be a relevant one at
the local level. For example, an article published on the Huffington Post based on the ongoing
debate in Illinois state argues "What’s going to happen to our income taxes in Illinois? Should
we switch to a progressive tax system with different rates that rise as incomes go up? Should we
maintain our flat system? Should our rate remain at the "temporary" 5 percent for individuals
or should it drop down to 3.75 percent as the law now says it should. It’s safe to say the income
tax debate is THE hot topic in Illinois this year."15
The choice between graduated and flat tax schedules has definitively been a hot topic in
the United States. Nevertheless, there has also been an intense debate in other countries. An
article appeared in The Economist analyzes the introduction of flat tax systems in Eastern
Europe and highlights that several countries in this region were already flattening their taxes
while "Americans (were) talking about it."16 One of the most important case-studies probably
is the introduction of a flat tax in Russia in 2001. The Russian case was probably the trigger of
the revival of this discussion both in academia and political discussions. Gorodnichenko et al.
(2009) assess Russia’s case using micro-data. Focusing on personal income taxes, the authors
find that the reform decreased the levels of tax evasion and, to a smaller extent, had a positive
productivity effect on the real side of the economy.17
11Other seminal papers studying the different implications of both tax systems are, for instance, Jakobsson
(1976), Hemming and Keen (1983) and Hall and Rabushka (1984).
12For more details on the implications of this reform, see Feldstein (1995) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1997).
13http://npr.org/2011/10/17/141407285/times-have-changed-since-reagans-1986-tax-reform
14http://wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576600760327683564
15http://huffingtonpost.com/matthew-dietrich/bringing-out-the-gloves-o_b_4762335.html?
16www.economist.com/node/3860731. For more details on the wave of flat tax reforms in eastern Europe, see
also, Stephanyan (2003).
17For more details on the Russian flat tax reform see, for instance, Brook and Leibfritz (2005) and Gaddy and
Gale (2006).
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There are several arguments in favor (and against) of both FRT and GRT systems. Flat-
tax supporters highlight, for instance, its simplicity, the potential improvements in compliance
and the elimination of the inefficient loopholes and preferences in the tax code that are po-
tential triggers of rent seeking. On the other hand, those in favor of a GRT argue that such
a schedule helps maximizing the tax revenue from each income group and have an important
re-distributional impact.18 Strikingly though, the pros and cons of both systems are often ap-
proached in a descriptive way, without giving neither scientific theoretical support nor conclusive
empirical evidence. A startling example is the discussion concerning equality that has been one
of the core arguments in the GRT-FRT debate. Equality is one of the main arguments of GRT
adherents. However, most of flat-tax supporters such as the Tea Party activist and candidate
for the 2012 Republican Party presidential nomination, Herman Cain, also argue that flattening
taxes rises equality.19 Although its relevance and some theoretical papers on the effects of flat
taxes on inequality, it is difficult to find scientific research showing empirical support for either
of these opposite arguments. The main reference among these theoretical papers is Davies and
Hoy (2002). The authors theoretically assess the inequality of after-tax distribution of (per-
sonal) income and prove the existence of critical flat tax rates such that inequality is higher,
lower or the same as with the previous GRT scheme. Subsequently, a number of theoretical
papers have taken up this point and extended their framework or tested it through simulation
models.20 In fact, another characteristic of previous literature on flat tax reforms is the lack
of empirical estimations using Western countries’ data. Most of the case studies are based on
Eastern European economies such as the ones mentioned before, but the potential effects of flat
tax reforms in Western countries have mainly been studied using simulation models rather than
real data-empirical estimations.21 One of the remarkable exceptions is the Swedish tax reform
of 1991, "the most far-reaching reform in any industrialized country in the postwar period. It
represents a thorough application of a strategy of rate cuts cum base broadening, and it has
affected a myriad of economic incentives in a more or less substantial way."(Agell et al. (1996)
p., 643). The Swedish reform introduced the so called Nordic dual income tax which separates
capital income from the taxation of any other income. The flat capital income tax rate was set
at 30%, in line with the already flat corporate tax rate. In other words, although the Swedish
reform was broader than a flat tax reform as defined in this paper, it did include certain features
18See Diamond and Saez (2011).
19http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/story/2011-10-10/herman-cain-9-9-9-tax-plan/
50723976/1
20Keen et al. (2008), for example, discuss the conditions for a flat tax reform to increase (or decrease) the level
of progressivity while allowing for non-neutral revenue reforms.
21Paulus and Peichl (2009) simulates the effects of a flat tax reform on Western economies and give a complete
review of other papers using similar simulation techniques.
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that are generally observed in this kind of reforms.22 There are some papers studying the effects
of the Swedish reform. Auerbach et al. (1995), for instance, estimate a model for investment
in equipment in order to assess the effects of the reform on investment. The authors conclude
that the reform had a minor impact on investment and had little to do with the sharp drop in
investment observed 4 years after its implementation.
2.2.2 Corporate income flat tax reforms
As mentioned before, the literature on corporate flat tax reforms is much scarcer than the one
focusing on personal income ones. Some papers do focus on the progressivity of corporate
taxes. Piketty and Saez (2007) provide estimates of U.S. federal tax rates by income groups in
order to assess the progressivity level of the U.S. federal tax system. The authors find a sharp
drop in progressivity mainly due to a reduction of corporate tax rates and in estate and gift
taxes combined with an important change in the composition of top incomes away from capital
income and toward labor income. Nevertheless, the focus of the paper is on the whole federal
tax system, without looking at lower levels of government. Moreover, they analyze continuous
changes during last 40 years rather than concentrating in particular shocks or reforms.23
There are some papers studying the potential effects of tax reforms on corporate taxes.
Nevertheless, most of the papers looking at corporate flat tax reforms either do it as part of
a broader flat tax reform usually including the flattening of personal income tax rates; or by
exclusively concentrating on corporate tax reforms that might include the introduction a FRT
scheme as part of the reform package. Feld (1995), for instance, discusses some of the structural
issues that a flat tax à la Hall and Rabushka would imply and, hence, simultaneously tackle
both personal and corporate income taxes. Similarly, Ventura (1999) considers a pure flat tax
reform by exploring its general equilibrium consequences. Moreover, as a reform à la Hall and
Rabushka has not been implemented yet, all these papers apply simulation techniques but none
of them tackle this issue from an empirical perspective using real data. Also in this direction
goes Keen et al. (2008). When analyzing the flat tax reforms on personal income taxes applied
by Eastern European countries, the authors make several references to the different effects on
corporate tax rates or corporate tax revenue. Nevertheless, the explicit goal of the authors is
to assess the flat tax reforms on personal income and, thus, only look at corporate taxes as a
second order effect. Moreover, the authors describe in detail several case-studies but do not
22For more details on the Swedish 1991 tax reform, see, the Report to the Expert Group on Public Economics
"Swedish Tax Policy: Recent Trends and Future Challenges".
23Other papers analyze how the level of progressivity on corporate taxes impacts on different outcomes. Agliardi
and Agliardi (2008), for example, discuss how different tax rules affect corporate liquidation policy and corporate
behavior. Auerbach (2006) and Liu and Altshuler (2013) focus on tax incidence issues. Nevertheless, none of
these papers exploit tax reforms.
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empirically estimate the effects of the reforms.
Finally, there are three empirical papers that we would like to highlight. Diamond and
Saez (2011) estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to the average
corporate tax rate. The authors use German tax return data to estimate their model and
find that a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate would reduce corporate tax receipts
less than proportionally. Interestingly, their identification strategy is based on the changes to
the corporate tax system introduced by the Tax Relief Act during 1998 − 2001. Despite the
magnitude of this reform, this cannot be considered as a flat tax reform because it did not replace
a GRT scheme with a FRT system. The schedule in Germany was already a FRT and "This tax
reform significantly reduced the statutory CIT rate and simultaneously broadened the tax base
by lowering depreciation allowances, restricting the use of a tax loss carryback, and changing the
treatment of non-depreciable assets that lose and then regain value." (Diamond and Saez (2011),
p., 119). Similarly, Richardson and Lanis (2007) asses the effects of a major reform on business
taxes in Australia. Nevertheless, they do not focus on firms’ location choices but rather on the
determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates after the so called Ralph Review
of Business Taxation reform. The authors exploit the modifications codified in the Income Tax
Assessment Act of 1997 to identify these determinants. Nevertheless, as Diamond and Saez
(2011), the reform the authors are assessing was a major one but was not a flat tax reform
(the corporate tax system was already a FRT scheme before the reform). These two papers
exploit major tax reforms on business taxes. Nevertheless, and even if they might have included
modifications in the parameters defining the progressivity of corporate taxes, neither of these
reforms implied a switch from a GRT scheme to a FRT system. Moreover, neither of these two
papers focus on firms’ location choices as we do. Finally, in Bacher and Brülhart (2013), the
authors explore the implications of changes in the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax
schedule, and the complexity of the tax code for entrepreneurial activity proxied by the count of
new firms in Switzerland. Results suggest a negative impact of average taxes and complicated
tax codes on firm birth rates. On the other hand, tax progressivity has a positive effect on
firm births. Interestingly, this paper focuses on corporate location choices in Switzerland as we
do. Nevertheless, the identification strategy is completely different. The authors compute a
progressivity measure based on the national distribution of capital and profitability across all
sectors to assess the impact of the progressivity level of the tax system on the number of new
firms rather than focusing on specific shocks or reforms as we do in this paper.
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2.3 The fiscal context in Switzerland24
Switzerland is a highly decentralized country composed of three levels of government. The Swiss
Federation has a unique fiscal system that makes this country an outstanding scenario to develop
our study.
In 1998 the federal government reformed its corporate tax schedule by introducing several
modifications. For instance, since then, capital is not taxed at the federal level and corporate
taxes shifted from a progressive to a flat tax rate. The federal government currently taxes profits
at a flat tax rate of 8.5%.
The lower tiers of government (cantons and municipalities) have important degrees of freedom
concerning their fiscal competencies. Cantons are free to tax personal income and wealth as well
as corporate profits and capital. Similarly, municipal governments have an important autonomy
in levying taxes on either of these items.
The total tax revenue raised is roughly equally divided among the three levels of government.
Moreover, while the federal government collects the main part of its tax revenue from indirect
taxes, the VAT and specific consumption taxes like the mineral oil tax; cantons and municipal-
ities strongly depend on tax revenues coming from personal and corporate income and wealth
taxes. In both cases, personal income tax accounts for the biggest portion of total tax revenue
(61% for cantons and 68% for municipalities) whereas corporate taxes on profit and capital
represent 18% (16%) and wealth taxes only 8% (9%) of cantonal (municipal) tax revenue.
In the Confederation, both personal and corporate income tax rates are jointly determined
by cantons and municipalities. The setting process of corporate taxes can be resumed as follows:
In a first stage, each canton sets a tax schedule where, for example, a basic statutory tax rate
and the level of deductions are defined. This tax schedule can only be modified by changing the
cantonal tax law. Then, every year, cantonal parliaments set a cantonal multiplier to be applied
to the statutory tax rate and municipalities (that take the cantonal tax schedule as given) do
the same by setting a municipal tax multiplier on an annual basis.25 In other words, unlike
corporate tax rates (and interestingly for our identification strategy), the main characteristics of
the corporate tax system such as its structure (i.e., the number of tax brackets to be applied) and
the level of deductions are uniquely determined at the cantonal level. Hence, local jurisdictions
24In this section we only describe the characteristics of the Swiss fiscal system that are relevant for this paper.
For a more complete description see, for example, Carey et al. (1999), Feld and Kirchgässner (2003), Parchet
(2014), and the report edited by the Swiss Fiscal Conference, L’imposition des personnes morales (2012). More-
over, this section describes the general tax setting process representing the majority of cantons and municipalities
in Switzerland. Particular cases and exceptions are taken into account when working with the data.
25There are cases in which other institutions such as parishes set their own tax multipliers applying a similar
methodology but, because of data constraints, we only consider the tax multipliers set at the cantonal and
municipal levels. These are, clearly, the most important ones. See, (Parchet).
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do influence corporate tax rates but cannot determine the progressivity of the tax schedule.
A particular feature of Swiss corporate taxes adding heterogeneity among cantons arises from
the fact that some of them base the calculation of the tax on profits, others on profitability, and
some on a combination. In many cantons, for instance, tax rates are a progressive function of
rate of return. This is calculated as profits divided by net worth. Thus, the corporate income
tax and the capital tax are closely related.
2.3.1 The flat tax reforms applied by Swiss cantons
To estimate our model, we take advantage of the observed trend in the Confederation towards
proportional corporate taxes. Since 1990, when Jura switched from a GRT to a FRT, other
cantons have been switching towards flat schedules as well. As we can observe from Table 2.1,
the number of cantons applying such a reform rose from 0 up to 14 during our sample period
and, interestingly, no canton had switched from a flat to a progressive tax schedule.
All these reforms obviously implied the introduction of a single corporate income tax rate.
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, flat tax reforms usually include other modifications in the
tax system. The deductions or even the definition of the tax base are, often, modified while
introducing flat taxes. Sometimes, other taxes such as personal income or capital ones are
modified as a part of the reforms package. Unlike in other cases (See Section 2.2), the reforms
introduced by Swiss cantons seem to have had the flattening of corporate tax rates as the main
goal. Deductions, for instance, have been slightly modified.
In Table 2.2 we describe the most relevant features of the reforms considered in this paper.
Let us briefly highlight the main common points and differences. The first marked difference
concerns the level of the post-reform tax rate. While only three cantons (Luzern, Saint Gallen
and Thurgau) set the flat tax rate close to the lowest of the pre-reform rates (i.e., they fixed
the single tax rate under the mean of the pre-reform lowest and highest values), five cantons
did the opposite. Only one canton (Jura) set the post-reform tax rate above the highest of the
pre-reform rates and, similarly, only one canton (Schaffhausen) set the post-reform flat-tax rate
at a lower level with respect to the minimum of the pre-reform rates. Other interesting feature
regards the other variable defining the progressivity of a tax scheme: deductions. Two cantons
did not introduce any modification to the deductions from corporate income taxes. The other
cantons applied minor modifications, mainly to the deductions from charity and donations and,
sometimes, to the period for which previous loses can be deducted. In addition, some cantons
also introduced modifications to capital taxes as part of the reform. While most of the cantons
had already a proportional tax scheme for capital, Jura had a graduated system and, thus,
introduced a FRT for both corporate income and capital taxes. The rest of the cantons either
reduced the capital tax rates (five cantons) or left them unchanged (four cantons).
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Table 2.1: Sample details
Canton Abbreviation Included in N. of Flat-Tax
the municipal municipalities reform (year)
level database in the sample
Aargau AG No - No
Appenzell Ausserrhoden AR No - Yes (1993)
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI Yes 6 Yes (1995)
Basel-Landschaft BL No - No
Basel-Stadt BS No - No
Bern BE Yes 371 No
Fribourg FR Yes 151 No
Geneva GE Yes 45 Yes (1999)
Glarus GL No - Yes (2009)
Graubünden GR No - Yes (2010)
Jura JU Yes 60 Yes (1990)
Lucerne LU Yes 86 Yes (1991)
Neuchâtel NE No - No
Nidwalden NW No - Yes (1995)
Obwalden OW No - Yes (1995)
Schaffhausen SH Yes 27 Yes (2008)
Schwyz SZ Yes 30 Yes (2010)
Solothurn SO No - No
St. Gallen SG Yes 81 Yes (2007)
Thurgau TG Yes 76 Yes (2006)
Ticino TI Yes 133 Yes (1995)
Uri UR No - Yes (2007)
Valais VS Yes 131 No
Vaud VD Yes 317 Yes (2002)
Zug ZG No - No
Zürich ZH Yes 171 Yes (2005)
Total - 14 1685 17
Notes: 12 cantons were excluded of our sample when working with municipal level data because of
data constraints regarding the effective average tax rate (EATR). A detailed discussion is given
in the Appendix 2.7. Note that Schwyz is included in the database as a non-switcher canton
because the reform was introduced in 2010 i.e., after the end of the period covered by our sample.
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Table 2.2: Flat tax reforms: summary
Canton Flat tax adopted
Corporate Income Capital
Other changes
Tax rates
Changes in deduction
Tax rates
Before After Before After
ZH 2005 4%-10% 8% 1.5‰ 0.75‰
The corporate income tax base
was modified. Profits on
securities and liquidations were
not taxable any more after the
reform.
LU 1991 4%-7.2% 4%
Deductions from charity and
donations were introduced (up
to 10% of taxable income with a
cap of 1000 CHF).
1‰ 1‰
The 32% cap for the total
corporate tax (cantonal +
municipal + church) was
eliminated.
SH 2008 6%-10% 5%
The cap on deductions from
charity and donations was
increased from 10% to 20% of
net income. Moreover, the
possibility of deducing voluntary
contributions to the federal
government, cantons,
municipalities for their
institutions was introduced.
1.5‰ 1‰
AI 1995 4%-8% 7%
Deductions from housing
maintenance and renovation
were eliminated. Introduction of
a 10% cap for deductions from
charity and donations.
1.5‰ 1.5‰
Minor modifications on the
capital tax base.
SG 2007 4.5%-7.5% 4,50%
Deductions on charity and
donations went from 10% to
20% of reported profits
0.2‰ 0.2‰
TG 2006 3%-7% with a maximum of 140.000 CHF 4%
Minor modifications to the
deductions from charity and
donations (introduction of the
possibility of deducing voluntary
contributions to the federal
government, cantons,
municipalities for their
institutions).
1.5‰ 0.3‰ with a minimum of 100 CHF
TI 1995 5%-18% with a total maximum of 14% 13%
The period for which previous
loses can be deducted was
extended from 3 to 7 fiscal
years. Deductions from charity
and donations were introduced
up to 5000 CHF.
3‰ 3‰
Minor modification in the
capital tax base definition
(mainly regarding the foreign
capital funds that are now
treated as own capital funds).
VD 2002 4%-14% 9,50%
Introduction of deductions from
research and development
entrusted to third parties (up to
10% of taxable profits with a
cap of 1 million CHF). Minor
modifications to deductions
from charity and donations
(introduction of a 10% of net
profits cap).
2‰ 1.2‰
Minor modification in the
capital tax base definition (an
exception concerning the
proportion of the capital
represented by shares of public
companies for which no dividend
is issued was eliminated).
GE 1999 6%-14% 10% 2‰ 1.8‰ and 2‰ for non taxable (on profits) firms
While before the reform,
municipalities taxed corporate
income on the same basis as the
canton, after the reform they do
it "sous forme de centimes
additionnels". Change on the
definition of taxable corporate
income. Before the reform, the
own capital was included in the
formula to compute the taxable
income.
JU 1990 2.3%-3.5% with a total maximum of 6.5% 4% without considering amounts smaller than 1000 CHF
Before the reform, the first
deductions from transfers to
pension funds for employees had
no limit and the following ones
were deductible up to 15% of the
wages. After the reform, these
limits were eliminated and the
transfers to pension funds for
employees are fully deductible).
The period for which previous
loses are deductible increase
from 3 (4 under authorization)
to 7 fiscal years.
0.6‰-1.25‰ 1‰
The capital tax system also
changed from a progressive to a
flat tax scheme. Before the
reform, if the cantonal
multiplier exceeded the double
of the statutory tax rate, it was
subject to a referendum.
Notes: This table discuss the reforms applied by the cantons during our sample period. The focus is on the parameters defining the progressivity level of a tax system i.e., the tax rate and deductions. The table also gives information on capital tax rates and, when
relevant, on other modifications that are worth mentioning. Note that, as one can observe in Table ??, Geneva, Glarus and Schwyz introduced a flat tax reform after 2008 which is the last year covered by our sample. Hence, this cantons are considered as non-switchers.
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Following the theoretical framework developed by Davies and Hoy (2002) for flat tax reforms
on personal income, one could expect to determine whether the introduction of a FRT increased
(decreased) the level of progressivity with respect to the previous GRT based on two parameters,
the marginal tax rate and the level of allowances or deductions. The authors show that the
progressivity of after-tax distribution of income is monotonically declining in the flat tax rate
and the associated level of basic allowance which generates the same tax yield.26 Proposition 4
summarizes their main results.27
Proposition 4 For any revenue neutral tax reform, which replaces a GRT with a FRT, there
exists a critical flat tax rate (tF ) such that compared to the GRT, after-tax income progressivity
is:
1. lower (for any inequality index) with any tF ≤ tlF ,
2. higher (for any inequality index) with any tF ≥ tuF ,
3. the same for a given inequality index at a specific flat tax rate between the lower and upper
boundaries (tlF < tF < tuF ).
The lower bound (tlF ) corresponds to the flat tax rate which provides a revenue neutral solution
if the deduction is kept at the same level as for the GRT. The upper bound (tuF ) is given by the
flat tax rate ensuring that individuals with the highest incomes pay the same tax under both
schemes. Finally, note that in comparison to the GRT, both tlF and tuF should lie between the
lowest and highest graduated tax rates.
The heterogeneity and complexity of flat tax reforms usually makes very difficult a clear
identification of the bounds defined by Davies and Hoy (2002).28 Moreover, the characteristics
of the Swiss fiscal system makes this task a particularly hard one. Therefore, even if their
framework is not enough to classify the reforms implemented among Swiss cantons as being more
or less progressive than the GRT schemes they replaced, it helps us to highlight some features
of these reforms that will be useful for the interpretation of our results. i) To the extent that the
flattening in tax rates is accompanied by a scaling back of the deductions, the reform will increase
progressivity. As shown in Table 2.2, this has not been the case in Switzerland, where most
of the cantons either did not modify the deductions on corporate income or introduced minor
26Davies and Hoy (2002) derive these conditions focusing on revenue neutral reforms. Nevertheless, by applying
the Hemming–Keen result for non-equal yield comparisons developed in Hemming and Keen (1983), Keen et al.
(2008) describe that the results used above continue to apply when the reform is not revenue neutral.
27These regularities were derived for personal income taxes. Given the scope of our paper, we adapted them
to a corporate tax framework.
28See, Paulus and Peichl (2009).
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changes that actually softened the conditions regarding these deductions.29 ii) All else (including
revenue) equal, adopting a flat tax is more likely to be progressive the higher is the single marginal
rate it applies.30 Unlike the reforms implemented in some of the Eastern European economies
(such as Latvia and Lithuania which both set the flat tax rate on personal income at the highest
marginal tax rate prior to reform), in most of Swiss cantons the flat tax reform implied a
reduction of the marginal tax rate for the highest incomes.31 To sum up, the characteristics
of the reforms applied in Switzerland suggest that the FRT schemes introduced by switcher
cantons reduced the progressivity level of the corporate tax schedules.
2.4 Data and descriptives32
To estimate our model, we assembled a panel data set with information mainly coming from
two different sources. First, the multi-annual Business Census (BC) carried out by the Federal
Statistical Office that is the only exhaustive census to collect data on all private and public
businesses and workplaces in Switzerland. The BC records establishments (of which there can
be several per firm) and attributes them to a NACE sector according to their self-declared
principal activity and gives information on the location and the employment level of all Swiss
firms. The BC had been conducted three times per decade (i.e. in years ending with 1, 5 and 8)
and took place for the last time in 2008.33 Therefore, we avail of data for 7 years (1985, 1991,
1995, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2008) over a 23-years period. This is a longer time-period compared
with previous studies.34 Second, we have assembled cantonal and municipal level data on local
taxes and other control variables from a variety of sources.
Our aim is to assess the impact of corporate flat tax reforms on firms’ location choices. Given
that the decision of switching from a GRT to a FRT scheme is entirely taken at the cantonal
level, one could argue that our data should be aggregated at this level. Moreover, working with
cantonal data allows us to include all 26 Swiss cantons.35 Nevertheless, analyzing the effect of
29Luzern, Thurgau and Ticino incorporated deductions on charity and donations and Schaffhausen and Saint
Gallen increased the cap for these deductions from 10% to 20% of net income and reported profits, respectively.
Similarly, Ticino and Jura extended the period for which loses can be deducted.
30As there are two relevant parameters defining the progressivity level of a tax scheme (the marginal tax rate
and the level of deductions), it is only possible to choose one of them freely when imposing revenue neutrality.
31The only exception is Jura that set the post-reform tax rate at a higher level than the highest of the pre-reform
bounds.
32We are thankful to Raphaël Parchet for having provided an important part of the information and data
described in this section.
33The Business Census was conducted until 2008 when it was substituted by STATNET.
34Bacher and Brülhart (2013), for instance, observe their explanatory variables for only 5 years (2001-2005).
35The data constraints described in Section 2.4 and in Appendix 2.7 are mostly related to the effective average
tax rate (EATR) which is (partly) defined at the municipal level. Thus, aggregating our data at the cantonal
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our policy at the cantonal level does not allow us to control for heterogeneities that might be
relevant to avoid confounding factors in our estimation. Most of the variables affecting firms’
location decisions are municipally-defined. In particular the effective average tax rate (EATR)
that is jointly defined by cantons and municipalities and is crucial to control for the level effect.
Thus, aggregating our dependent variable at the cantonal level would generate an important
loss of information that could bias our estimates. Finally, working with municipal-level data
considerably increases the number of observations and, hence, allows us to rise the power of
our estimations and to reduce the relative weight of smaller cantons.36 Hence, our preferred
specification is computed with municipal-level data. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness,
we estimate our model with aggregated data at the cantonal level as well.37
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for all the variables both at the cantonal and municipal
levels.
Our main dependent variable accounts for the total number of firms. At the municipal level
it ranges from a minimum of 1 firm in several small localities to a maximum of more than
26, 000 in the city of Zürich. In addition, in Section 2.6, we consider the number of firms with
one employee as an alternative dependent variable to test for heterogeneities in the effects of
the reform.
Unlike recent taxation papers that focus on firm births or entry in order to reduce potential
endogeneity issues, our dependent variable is given by the stock of firms. The main argument
given by those studies is that they control (although imperfectly) for the potential simultaneity
bias that might arise because of firms influencing the tax setting process through the tax base.
The hypothesis is that entrants are supposed to be less likely to significantly influence pre-
existing local tax rates. However, this is a secondary issue for us, given that our focus is on
a policy decided at the cantonal level and, thus, less likely to be affected by this simultaneity
bias. In other words, the cantonal decision of applying a GRT or a FRT scheme is unlikely to be
affected by the (municipal) stock of firms. Nevertheless, even when the EATR is an important
regressor but not our main explanatory variable, we are aware that tax rates might create some
concerns regarding potential endogeneity issues. In Section 2.5 we come back to this and other
estimation issues.
Our main explanatory variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 whenever a certain canton
level would allow us to include all cantons in our database.
36As we explain in detail in Appendix 2.7, by considering municipal-level data we lose those cantons for which
gathering data to compute the EATR was impossible. On the other hand, the number of observations increases
considerably and we end up with a panel of almost 1, 700 municipalities (belonging to a sub-sample of 14 cantons)
accounting for roughly 60% of the total number of local jurisdictions.
37All tables in Section 2.6 show both specifications. Nevertheless, unless specified otherwise, the interpretation
and discussion of the results are based on the estimations using municipal-level data.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Municipal level
Dependent variables
Number of firms 158.858 813.357 1 26172 11524
Number of firms with one employee 40.065 209.621 0 7602 11524
Independent variables
Flat tax dummy 0.246 0.431 0 1 11524
Corporate tax rate 15.072 3.879 3.265 30.667 11524
% Inactive and unemployed 2.345 1.995 0 28.947 11524
Population (in 1.000) 26.329 3.215 6.351 43.171 11524
% Young (≤ 15) 19.715 3.721 0 43.636 11524
% Old (≥ 65) 14.211 4.567 2.446 57.447 11524
% Foreigners 10.853 8.826 0 53.569 11524
% German speaking population 52.593 43.043 0 100 11524
% Left-wing votes in national ballots 18.645 9.609 0 70.100 11524
Personal income tax rate 26.329 3.215 6.351 43.171 11524
% Protestant population 42.675 30.074 0 100 11524
Instrumental variable
Average % left-wing votes in national ballots in neighbors 18.103 5.793 0 38.638 11524
Cantonal level
Dependent variables
Number of firms 14179.791 14748.157 774 70179 182
Number of firms with one employee 3613.764 3951.3 182 21038 182
Independent variables
Flat tax dummy 0.264 0.442 0 1 182
Corporate tax rate 12.2 3.231 4.9 21.9 182
% Inactive and unemployed 2.8 1.8 0.5 8.5 182
Population (in 1.000) 274.614 284.658 13.285 1332.730 182
% Young (≤ 15) 18.2 2.4 11.4 24.2 182
% Old (≥ 65) 14.8 2.1 10.3 21.0 182
% Foreigners 16.5 6.4 6.2 38.1 182
% German speaking population 66.7 33.6 3.9 94.0 182
% Left-wing votes in national ballots 25.497 15.883 0 85.7 182
Personal income tax rate 23.103 4.917 10.76 32.08 182
% Protestant population 28.5 1.85 4.7 77.0 182
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applies a flat tax schedule on corporate taxes and 0 otherwise. As it can be observed from Table
2.1, our more comprehensive sample includes 14 switcher cantons: Appenzell Auss, Appenzell
Inn, Geneva, Jura, Lucerne, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, Thurgau, Ticino,
Uri, Vaud and Zürich, and 12 cantons that did not switch: Aargau, Bern, Basel-Landschaft,
Basel-Stadt, Bern, Fribourg, Glarus, Graubünden, Neuchâtel, Schwyz, Solothurn, Valais and
Zug. In the sub-sample in which we consider municipal level data, there are 10 switcher cantons:
Lucerne, Jura, Appenzell Inn., Ticino, Geneva, Zürich, Vaud, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen and
Thurgau, and 4 cantons that have always applied a GRT system: Bern, Valais, Schwyz and
Fribourg.
Concerning the rest of the regressors, the most relevant one is the EATR. This is a key
variable in our setting given the relative importance of controlling for the level effect.
Gathering the data to compute the EATR at the local level back to 1985 was a hard task
and, unfortunately, it was impossible for some cantons. Moreover, as in the Confederation there
is no firm-level data on profits or profitability, we followed Brülhart et al. (2012) in order to
compute the EATR by considering a firm with a median capital and profitability according
to the distribution of all Swiss firms. As shown in Figure 2.1, the EATR presents important
variation in both time and the cross-sectional dimensions; ranging from a minimum of 3.26% to
a maximum of 30.67%, roughly ten times higher.38;39
Other than our dependent variable and main regressors described before, we also include
a set of control variables. Those variables aim at controlling for time variant municipal- (or
cantonal-) level heterogeneities. Time invariant ones are captured by municipal (or cantonal)
fixed effects. Personal income tax rates and population are based on annual data, while de-
mographic characteristics such as % inactive and unemployed, % young (≤ 15),% old (≥ 65),
% foreigners, % German speaking population and % protestant population, are taken from the
decennial Swiss census.
Finally, % left votes in national ballots, our instrumental variable, accounts for the votes
received by the socialist and other left-wing parties in the previous national election.
38As it is described in the Appendix 2.7, the EATR formula does not include include federal tax rates, which
would only scale up these values.
39Gathering the data for the aggregated data at the cantonal level was more straightforward. The tax rates
were directly taken from the Swiss Federal tax Administration’s annual publication on the tax burden in the
cantonal capitals. This publication provides information on the cantonal average tax burden and, hence, we
follow Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) by using the tax burden of a representative firm with 2, 000, 000 CHF of
capital and a 8% rate of return on capital to compute the cantonal tax rates.
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ETR 2008 - ETR 1985
-12.8936 - -11.8659
-11.8659 - -8.7933
-8.7933 - -6.2022
-6.2022 - -5.0604
-5.0604 - -3.4410
-3.4410 - -0.9780
-0.9780 - 1.5103
1.5103 - 2.9607
2.9607 - 4.6139
4.6139 - 9.8629
Variation Effective Tax Rate 1985 - 2008
Effective Tax Rate (mun + can)
0.0000 - 13.9215
13.9215 - 14.8633
14.8633 - 15.9126
15.9126 - 17.0731
17.0731 - 18.6948
18.6948 - 19.4654
19.4654 - 21.1699
21.1699 - 23.3215
23.3215 - 25.2332
Effective Tax Rate 1985
Effective Tax Rate (mun + can)
0.0000 - 8.1135
8.1135 - 10.3369
10.3369 - 11.9170
11.9170 - 13.8086
13.8086 - 15.9905
15.9905 - 17.6366
17.6366 - 19.0025
19.0025 - 20.2589
20.2589 - 21.8375
Effective Tax Rate 2008
Figure 2.1: Effective average corporate tax rate: variation within and between municipalities
52
14
00
00
16
00
00
18
00
00
20
00
00
22
00
00
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
YEAR
Treated group Control group
Figure 2.2: Trends of the number of firms for switcher and non-switcher cantons
2.5 Empirical framework and estimation
2.5.1 Empirical model
We estimate the impact of a flat tax reform on corporate taxes on the number of firms through
the following model:
Ykt = βFTkt + αXkt + δk + γt + kt, (2.1)
where k denotes the geographical unit or area (either municipality or canton) and t the year.
The dependent variable Ykt accounts for the number of firms in the area k and year t. FTkt is a
dummy taking the value of 1 whenever a canton applies a FRT scheme and 0 otherwise. Xkt is
the set of control variables previously described and δk and γt are, respectively, area and year
fixed effects. Finally, kt is the error term.
As mentioned before, since canton Jura introduced a flat tax reform in 1990, several other
cantons have been switching from a GRT to a FRT. Therefore, we exploit the different timing
of the implementation of these reforms and estimate our model in Equation (2.1) by applying
a panel-based differences-in-differences approach. The necessary condition to interpret β as an
unbiased coefficient is that the number of firms from the treated and untreated cantons follow
the same trends. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of firms for both groups. The
figure shows a common underlying trend for both switcher and non-switcher cantons which is
not limited to the pre-treatment period.
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2.5.2 Endogeneity
As we have briefly discussed in Section 2.4, we believe that our main regressor (FTkt) is un-
likely to present major endogeneity issues. The potential bias due to confounding factors (i.e.,
cantonal time-variant unobserved characteristics that systematically correlate with the decision
of switching to a FRT scheme and affect the number of firms as well) should not be a major
concern in our specification. Indeed, this potential bias is even less of a concern in our preferred
specification, where we estimate Equation (2.1) using municipal-level data.
One could also be concerned about potential simultaneity bias arising through the tax rate.
This would be a major issue if tax rates were clearly correlated to our flat tax dummy. In
that case, the inclusion of such an endogenous regressor would bias the estimates of our main
explanatory variable. In other words, there is a trade-off between controlling for the level effect
by assuming the risk of potentially biasing our estimates or excluding the EATR from our model
and, thus, do not correctly disentangling the level effect from the impact of flatness in itself. We
stick to the former strategy because our setting does not seem to present a systematic correlation
between the tax rates and the flat tax dummy. Even if the introduction of a flat tax reform
might be often taken as an opportunity to modify the tax rates, there is no reason to believe,
a priori, that there exists a uni-directional relationship between both variables. Indeed, as one
can observe from Table 2.2, the variation of corporate tax rates during the application of the
flat tax reforms was quite heterogeneous with most of the cantons applying a post-reform tax
rate between the pre-reform minimum and maximum rates and a few cantons applying a post-
reform tax rate below (above) the lowest (highest) rate of the pre reform scheme. In addition,
even if the reforms systematically affected the corporate tax rates in the same direction, the
EATR would always have a municipal component and, thus, corporate tax rates would vary
within cantons. Hence, even in such a scenario, the estimated coefficient of FTkt would still
have a causal interpretation and, moreover, our estimates would be more precise by including
the endogenous regressor than by excluding it from the model.
To sum up, we do not find endogeneity to be a main concern in our setting. Nevertheless,
for the sake of correctness we tackle the potential simultaneity bias arising from the EATR and,
hence, we complement our baseline specification with an instrumental variables (IV) strategy.
More precisely, we instrument the corporate tax rate of a given municipality with the average
vote share obtained by left-wing parties in federal elections in neighbor municipalities within a
ray of 15 kilometers and with a 10 years lag. Our strategy combines two standard approaches
by using a political instrument that considers both the spatial and temporal dimensions.40
A valid instrument should satisfy two requirements: the relevance and the exogeneity con-
40For example, Chirinko and Wilsom (2010) exploit a political instrument in a spatial setting, while Brülhart
et al. (2012) apply an instrument based on past elections.
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ditions. Our instrument is relevant because voter’s neighboring jurisdictions affected taxes in
these jurisdictions in the same way that voter’s preferences in municipality i affected its own
taxation decisions and, moreover, the taxation level 10 years ago is likely to be correlated to the
present tax rate.
Unlike the relevance condition (that can be tested through a weak instrument test), the
exogeneity condition cannot be tested. Ideally, one would expect the lagged-neighbors voter’s
preferences (i.e., the instrument) to affect the number of firms (i.e., our dependent variable)
uniquely through tax rates (i.e., the endogenous regressor).41 Gibbons and Overman (2012)
suggest that the the exclusion restriction is difficult to be satisfied if the instrument relies on
the spatial dimension. In our setting, for example, one could think that an exogenous shock
such as an economic crisis might reduce the number of firms and, at the same time, affect
voting preferences, regardless the municipality of interest. If this was the case, the omitted
variable bias would still be an issue in our estimation. This said, our strategy combines both
the spatial and temporal dimensions. Hence, one could expect the exclusion restriction to be
more likely to be satisfied. In our setting, the 10 years lag should help to reduce the potential
effects of those common shocks. Moreover, in most of our specifications we apply municipal
fixed effects and control for canton-specific time trends that would also reduce the effects of
those potential common shocks. Therefore, one could argue that our instrument is exogenous,
at least conditioned on the rest of our controls.
2.5.3 Inference
As it is nicely described by Cameron and Miller (2015), whenever regression model errors are cor-
related within clusters, not controlling for within-cluster error correlation can overstate estima-
tion precision by generating misleadingly small standard errors, misleadingly narrow confidence
intervals and, thus, large t-statistics and low p-values.
The need for such a control obviously increases with the magnitude of the within-cluster
error correlation. Clustering is particularly an issue when applying difference-in-differences in a
state-year panel like we do. Indeed, we need to adjust standard errors because of both within-
canton correlation and serial correlation because shocks are not likely to be independent across
cantons nor over-time. In our setting, the within-cluster error correlation is given by the fact
of having our main explanatory variable (FT ) defined at the cantonal level and our dependent
variable disaggregated at the municipal one. Moreover, in our model, FT equals 1 for the year
that the flat tax reform was introduced and every year thereafter. Hence, we are in presence
of high serial correlation and, thus, the default standard errors are expected to be downwards-
41Note that by considering federal elections (instead of local ones) we rule out potential concerns on the
exogeneity of the instrument coming from the presence of yardstick competition.
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biased. One could argue that by applying cluster-specific fixed effects we partially control for
cluster correlation. Nevertheless, in order to get valid standard errors, we need to compute them
by using the cluster-robust estimate of the variance matrix (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Once the need for computing cluster-robust standard errors is clear, the next important
decision to make is the level at which to cluster. When working with cantonal-level data, the
decision is quite straightforward. We compute a 2-way (canton-year) clustering in order to con-
trol, at the same time, for the potential error correlation coming from within-canton and serial
correlation. The level at which to cluster is less evident when we move at our municipal-level
data. As with the magnitude of the within-cluster error correlation, the need for clustering
increases with the size of within-cluster correlation of regressors and with the number of ob-
servations within a cluster. Moulton (1986) and Moulton (1990), for instance, assess the case
where individual outcomes (e.g. wages) are regressed on explanatory variables observed at a
more aggregated level (e.g. employment growth at the state level). In other words, the issue
comes from the policy variable taking the same value for all observations within each cluster.
We follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and cluster the errors at one level higher than the one we
would have chosen in absence of serial correlation. Hence, we cluster our standard errors at the
cantonal rather than at the municipal level.
Unfortunately, we are in presence of another issue. The cluster-robust covariance matrix is
consistent when the number of clusters →∞. In practice, the rule of thumb suggests that one
should have, at least, between 20 and 50 clusters in order to avoid this issue. Given the low
number of Swiss cantons, in our two specifications we are left with a too low number of clusters.
More precisely, we end up with 26 clusters when working with cantonal-level data and 14 in the
municipal-level setting. Concerning the few-clusters issue, the rule of thumb is similar to the
one given by Bertrand et al. (2004): "There is no general solution to this trade-off, and there is
no formal test of the level at which to cluster. The consensus is to be conservative and avoid
bias and use bigger and more aggregate clusters when possible, up to and including the point
at which there is concern about having too few clusters." (Cameron and Miller (2015), p., 17).
Finally, in our setting the concern is even higher because, in our preferred specification (mu-
nicipal level data), we are working with unbalanced clusters.42 Thus, the number of clusters
to ensure a consistent estimation of the cluster-robust covariance matrix should be even higher
than the 20 to 50 clusters suggested for the balanced case.43 In order to account for this, we
follow (Cameron et al., 2008) and also compute wild-bootstrap standard errors when working
with local-level data. This is an alternative method that estimates the cluster-robust covari-
ance matrix by randomly drawing clusters rather than individual observations and taking all
42For example, Vaud and Appenzell Inn. have 376 and 6 municipalities, respectively.
43See, for example, (Imbens and Kolesar, 2012) and (MacKinnon and Webb, 2015).
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observations for each drawn cluster.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Baseline results
Our baseline results are shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Flat tax reforms and the number of firms
Cantonal level Municipal level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Flat tax dummy -0.030 -0.036* -0.013** 0.026 0.000 -0.022* -0.017
(0.030) (0.020) (0.006) (0.029) (0.024) (0.012) (0.022)
P=0.485 P=0.957 P=0.172 -
Corporate tax rate 0.000 -0.002 0.004** 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017)
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton control variables No Yes Yes No Nos No No
Canton x time trend No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipal FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal control variables No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.550 0.677 0.960 0.160 0.179 0.208 0.207
Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat) 7.50
N. Observations 182 182 182 11524 11524 11524 11524
N. Cantons 26 26 26 14 14 14 14
N. Municipalities - - - 1685 1685 1685 1685
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is Log(total number of firms). In columns (1-3), standard errors
(in parenthesis) are clustered two-way by canton and year and they are clustered at the cantonal level in columns (4-7). In columns
(4-7) below the standard errors we report the wild bootstrap p-values. The weak instrument test reports the Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat)
of the first stage regression where the dependent variable is corporate tax rate and the instrument is the 10-years lag value of the
average vote share obtained by left-wing parties in federal elections in neighbour municipalities within a ray of 15 kilometers. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
Whilst Columns (1), (2) and (3) show our results working with cantonal-level data, Columns
(4), (5), (6) and (7) show the estimation of Equation (2.1) using data disaggregated at the
municipal level, with Column (7) showing the results for the IV estimation described in Section
2.5.2.44
44As we are dealing with few clusters, in order to get a more precise estimation of the standard errors, all
regressions are run using the command regress from Stata and considering differences from the mean (Cameron
and Miller, 2015).
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The first three columns show a negative effect of the flat tax reform on the number of firms
in a canton. The more demanding specifications (in terms of included controls) are statistically
different from 0. Instead, when moving to the municipal-level estimates, the simplest specifica-
tion (where only municipal and year fixed effects are included) shows a positive (not statistically
significant) effect of the flat tax dummy on the number of firms. As observed in Columns (5)
and (6), as we increase the number of control variables the estimated coefficient decreases and,
in our preferred specification, where we add our set of control variables and control for canton
specific time trends, the coefficient turns negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level).
Note that the coefficient turns negative after controlling for canton-specific time trend, which is
a proxy for observable and unobservable cantonal time-variant characteristics.
As the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of firms the estimated β1 represents
the semi-elasticity of number of firms with respect to the introduction of the flat tax reform.
Hence, in terms of magnitude, the coefficient of the flat tax dummy in our preferred specification
suggests that, on average, introducing a FRT scheme on corporate taxes decreases the number
of firms by roughly 2.2%. For the average municipality in our sample, such a reform implies a
reduction of roughly 3 firms.
As mentioned before, not controlling for the level effect could potentially be an issue in our
setting. Nevertheless, our estimates of corporate tax show a rather small effect that, in our
preferred specification, is not statistically significant.
Finally, in Column (7) corporate tax rate is instrumented as explained in Section 2.5.2.
The coefficient of the flat tax dummy is in line with the one found in Column (6), although
not statistically different from 0. The instrument is statistically significant but presents some
concerns regarding the relevance condition. It does not pass the weak instrument test based on
the two stage least squares (TSLS) bias (Stock et al. (2002) and Stock and Yogo (2002)). The
reported F-statistic (7.5) is below the common critical value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock
(1997) as a rule of thumb for the case with one endogenous regressor.45 Nevertheless, the first
stage regression (reported in the Appendix 2.7) between corporate tax rate and our instrument
shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient (at the 5% level) and, moreover, in Section
2.5.2, we have already discussed why we think that our instrument explains an important part
of the variation in the endogenous variable.
To summarize, on average, switching from a GRT to a FRT scheme reduces the number
of firms in a given municipality. Nevertheless, the effect is rather small in magnitude and the
precision of our estimates is not always the expected one, probably because we are identifying
the impact of the policy over a low number of cantons.
45See also Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
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2.6.2 Discussion and interpretation
The negative effect of flattening corporate taxes seems to be quite robust, at least qualitatively
speaking. On average, firms prefer to locate in a jurisdiction where a GRT scheme is in place
rather than where corporate taxes are flat. The interpretation of our findings goes through the
so-called insurance effect.
Let us recall the definition of the insurance effect given by Bacher and Brülhart (2013):
"Keeping the expected after-tax profits constant, progressive taxation reduces the variance of
profits by more than linear taxation. As a consequence, tax progressivity serves as an insurance
device: in bad times, an entrepreneur has to pay less than under a flat tax, whereas in good times
the tax bill is higher. (Bacher and Brülhart (2013) p., 134). The mechanism through which this
effect affects firms’ location decisions is not straightforward. Let us thus clarify the intuition
behind the insurance effect through a simple numerical application of the model presented in
Bacher and Brülhart (2013).
We start by assuming a risk averse firm that, with equal probability, could make either a
50, 000 $ profit (bad outcome) or a 150, 000 $ profit (good outcome) in time t+ 1. Further, let’s
assume that in time t, the entrepreneur chooses to settle her firm either in jurisdiction i or j
which only differ in their tax schedules: the former applies a proportional or flat tax schedule
while the latter applies a progressive one. Indeed, while jurisdiction i implements a 20% flat
tax rate, jurisdiction j applies a progressive tax schedule with two tax brackets: a 12% tax rate
that applies to profits up to 50, 000 $ and a 28% tax rate rate that applies to profits above
50, 000 $. Thus, if the firm decided to locate in municipality i, it would make an after-tax
profit of 40, 000 $ under the bad scenario or a 120, 000 $ under the good one. Therefore, the
expected tax payments would equal 20, 000 $ and the expected net profits would be 80, 000 $.
Similarly, if the firm located in jurisdiction j, its after-tax profit would be 44, 000 $ under the
bad scenario and 116, 000 $ under the good one. Note that, both the expected tax payments
and net profits are the same as those in jurisdiction i i.e., 20, 000 $ and 80, 000 $, respectively.
However, the expected profit variability decreases if the firm decided to settle in jurisdiction
j. Therefore, given the risk aversion assumption, the firm will prefer to locate in jurisdiction j
where a progressive tax schedule is applied because the aforementioned insurance effect reduces
the uncertainty on future profit realizations and, thus, one would expect that the introduction
of a flat-tax schedule negatively affects the attractiveness of a municipality for firms.
In Section 2.3, we showed that a flat tax reform does not necessarily imply a reduction of
the progressivity. On the other hand, we also showed that the reforms applied by Swiss cantons
have, indeed, reduced the progressivity of the tax schedule. Hence, in Switzerland, the insurance
effect is likely to be one of the factors explaining the negative impact of the introduction of a
corporate flat tax reform on the attractiveness of local jurisdictions for firms.
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2.6.3 Robustness checks
Our baseline results in Table 2.4 show the average effect of the introduction of a flat tax reform
on the number of firms in a given jurisdiction. We have just explained why we consider the
insurance effect to be a potential explanation for our findings. Now, if this is the case, one
should observe that this effect is stronger for riskier firms.
There are some studies assessing the relationship between profitability and firm size. Bal-
lantine et al. (1993) analyses the connections between variations in profit and loss rates among
firms in small-firm and large-firm size classes as reflections of uncertainty finding that, within
industries, such variations are particularly important for smaller firms. More recently, Lafrance
(2012) finds an inverted u-shaped relationship between profit rates and firm size using Canadian
data. An association between firm size, risk and return accounting for this profitability/size
relationship may also exist. Some studies suggest that there is a risk-return trade-off i.e., higher
rates of return are obtained by increasing risk. Indeed, in many models such as the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), risk is measured by the volatility in rates of return.46 Concerning
the heterogeneity among firms, small (and medium-sized) enterprises tend to take on more risk
and to face more uncertainty. Lafrance (2012), for instance, found higher volatility in the rates
of return for smaller firms, especially, the smallest. Moreover, models of equilibrium credit ra-
tioning assessing moral hazard and adverse selection issues also suggest that small firms may
be particularly vulnerable (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). These models highlight that small firms
are often informationally opaque i.e., smaller firms are a greater challenge for lenders because of
difficulties in assessing risk due to, for instance, a lack of publicly available, transparent infor-
mation (Cole et al. (2004)). Finally, small firms are also vulnerable because of their dependency
on financial institutions for external funding. These firms simply do not have access to public
capital markets. As a result, shocks to the banking system can have a significant impact on the
supply of credit to small businesses. In a recent study using U.S. data, Mills and McCarthy
(2014) find a sharp decline in bank lending to small businesses during the 2008 financial crisis
and a relatively slow recovery.
Hence, as a robustness check, we estimate Equation (2.1) by only considering firms with
one employee. The intuition behind this strategy is that small firms should be riskier and face
higher uncertainty than bigger ones and, thus, should react more than the average firm to the
introduction of a flat tax reform.
Table 2.5 presents exactly the same structure as Table 2.4 but the dependent variable is now
the number of firms with one employee. The analysis at the cantonal level shows results that
are in line with those of our first estimation. A flat tax reform negatively affects the number
of uni-personal firms. As expected, our estimates are bigger in magnitude than those shown in
46See, for example, Lintner (1969).
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Table 2.5: Flat tax reforms and the number of firms with 1 employee
Cantonal level Municipal level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Flat tax dummy -0.074* -0.078** -0.036* 0.036 -0.002 -0.071*** -0.089**
(0.040) (0.030) (0.018) (0.042) (0.034) (0.022) (0.040)
P=0.513 P=0.969 P=0.045 -
Corporate tax rate 0.000 -0.006* 0.005 -0.002 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.022)
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton control variables No Yes Yes No Nos No No
Canton x time trend No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipal FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal control variables No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.648 0.736 0.949 0.119 0.138 0.159 0.156
Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat) 7.64
N. Observations 182 182 182 11330 11330 11330 11330
N. Cantons 26 26 26 14 14 14 14
N. Municipalities - - - 1685 1685 1685 1685
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is Log(total number of firm with 1 employee). In columns (1-3),
standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered two-way by canton and year and they are clustered at the cantonal level in columns (4-7).
In columns (4-7) below the standard errors we report the wild bootstrap p-values. The weak instrument test reports the Kleibergen-Paap
(F-stat) of the first stage regression where the dependent variable is corporate tax rate and the instrument is the 10-years lag value of
the average vote share obtained by left-wing parties in federal elections in neighbour municipalities within a ray of 15 kilometers. * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4 and, moreover, are all statistically significant.
These results are confirmed when using municipal-level data. In Column (6), our preferred
specification, the estimate is negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) and the
coefficient is almost four times the one obtained in the full-sample estimation (Column (6),
Table 2.4). Moreover, even in the more conservative specification in terms of inference (wild-
bootstrap standard errors), the p-value confirms that the coefficient is statistically different from
0 ( at the 5% level). When considering the sub-sample of uni-personal firms, switching from a
GRT to a FRT scheme reduces the number of firms by more than 7%.
Once again, Column (7) shows the results for our IV specification. The reported F-statistic
is slightly higher than the on in Table 2.4 but is still lower than 10. Thus, the same discussion
regarding the weak instrument test applies. However, the coefficient of flat tax dummy is con-
siderably lower than the one computed in Table 2.4 (it decreased from −0.017 to −0.089) and
statistically significant at the 5% level.
As expected, these firms seem to value the reduction in the uncertainty on future profit real-
izations given by a progressive tax schedule more than the average firm. Hence, the sensitivity
of these firms to the introduction of a flat tax reform is higher than the one of the average firm.
Indeed, in all specifiations the estimates are, at least, two to three times the ones in Table 2.4.
Hence, these findings seem to confirm that the insurance effect might be playing an important
role in explaining the reduction of firms observed in switcher cantons.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper assesses the effect of introducing a flat tax reform on corporate income taxes on
firms’ location choices. Our results show that the effect of such a reform is, on average, negative
but rather small. Our interpretation of these findings goes through the insurance effect. This
effect suggests that, the reduction in the uncertainty on future profit realizations given by a
progressive tax schedule should act as insurance for the entrepreneur and, thus, firms should
prefer to locate in jurisdictions where a GRT scheme is in place. Our finding that smaller firms
are more sensitive to the introduction of a FRT system than the average firm confirms our
interpretation. Indeed, when estimating our model by uniquely considering uni-personal firms,
the coefficients considerably increase in magnitude and are more precisely estimated.
Despite this negative impact, there has been an increasing number of Swiss cantons intro-
ducing flat corporate taxes since 1990. One could argue that a flat tax reform might have several
effects other than reducing the attractiveness of a particular jurisdiction for firms. Nevertheless,
the reduction of the tax base given by such a reform should be considered by cantonal author-
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ities before deciding whether to switch to a GRT scheme or not. This could be a particularly
relevant issue for small cantons, where the share of small firms is higher and, thus, the potential
negative impact on their tax base would be stronger as well.
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Appendix 2.A Effective average tax rate (EATR)
Based on statutory tax rates and average profits and capital stocks estimated from the national
distribution of capital and profitability across all sectors, we computed the effective average tax
rate (EATR), which is a key regressor in our model in order to control for the level effect. The
EATR for a firm settled in municipality i in canton c is as follows:
EATR = T
pi
ic(pi − T kick)
(1 + T piic)pi
, (2.A.1)
where Tic ≡ τc × (ηc + ηic); τc is the basic statutory tax rate, ηc is the cantonal multiplier and
ηic is the multiplier applied by municipality i in canton c. Moreover, pi denotes pre-tax profits
and k is the own capital. Thus, Tpi is the statutory corporate income tax rate and Tk is the
statutory capital tax rate.
To compute the EATR, we have gathered data on corporate tax rates by asking for the
cantonal and municipal multipliers directly to cantonal authorities. Where we did not received
answer or where the data was not available for the period we are working with, we exploited
the fact of many municipalities applying the same multiplier for both personal and corporate
incomes because a cantonal law constrains them to do so. In these cases, we replicate the
corporate income multiplier by the personal income one for which we have data for the totality
of Swiss municipalities from 1980 to 2011 (Parchet, 2014). In addition, for the cases where there
is no formal law constraining municipal tax authorities to set a unique multiplier, we computed
(by canton) the correlation of both municipal multipliers based on yearly data coming from a
sub-sample of more than 600 municipalities (representing roughly 25% of all Swiss municipalities)
for the period 2001-2011 for which we have data on both tax instruments. In these cases, and
in order to minimize the potential bias coming from errors in the data, we decided to keep in
our sample only the cantons where this correlation was higher than 95%. For these cantons,
again, we used the personal income multiplier. To sum up, we only consider for our study
municipalities located in cantons where i) we have the real data on the local corporate income
multipliers or ii) the tax multipliers for personal and corporate incomes are the same (either by
cantonal law or by a non-written agreement or tradition showing a correlation of 95% or higher
in our sub-sample). After this procedure, we end up with a sample of 1, 689 municipalities which
accounts for around 60% of total Swiss local jurisdictions and 70% of all firms. More precisely,
our final sample is composed of the following 14 cantons: Zürich, Bern, Lucerne, Appenzell
Inn., St. Gallen, Vaud, Valais, Jura, Schwyz, Fribourg, Schaffhausen, Thurgau, Ticino and
Geneva.47 Finally, the following 12 cantons were not included in our sample either because we
did not get any data or because the correlation among the multipliers was lower than 95%: Uri,
47The first 8 cantons impose (by law) that personal income and corporate multipliers are the same. The latter
6 ones, were included because of high correlation between both tax instruments in our sub sample.
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Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glarus, Zug, Solothurn, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Appenzell Aus.,
Graubünden, Aargau and Neuchâtel.48 In the presence of two or more municipalities merging,
the EATR is computed by taking the average value of previous jurisdictions’ EATRs.
48We are currently waiting for some cantonal authorities to send us the requested data. Hence, in near future,
we expect to extend our sample by including, at least, some of the 12 cantons left out.
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Appendix 2.B First stage regressions
Table 2.6: First stage regressions
IV Table 2.4 IV Table 2.5
(1) (2)
% left-wing votes in neighbors t−10 0.090** 0.091**
(0.033) (0.033)
Municipal FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Canton x time trend Yes Yes
Municipal control variables Yes Yes
R-squared 0.634 0.633
N. Observations 11524 11330
Notes: Intercept included in all regressions. The dependent variable is corporate tax
rate. In all columns, standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the cantonal level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Market Structure and the Functional
Form of Demand, the Missing Links
between Tax Incidence and Tax
Competition
3.1 Introduction
The tax incidence literature is unconcerned about tax competition issues. At most, the incidence
of local and federal taxes is studied separately without accounting for any strategic interaction,
neither vertical nor horizontal.1 Indeed, traditional tax incidence models usually consider tax
rates to be exogenously determined and focus on the pass-through of taxes to consumer prices
without taking the tax setting-process into account.2 On the other hand, several strands of
literature such as optimal taxation and tax competition do focus on the tax setting decision but
do not consider tax incidence issues. Standard tax competition models, for example, consider
the strategic tax setting by different levels of government (or different jurisdictions belonging
to the same tier of government) sharing the tax base but implicitly assume that the incidence
of taxes is fully on consumers by assuming producer prices to be constant.3 Therefore, the
potential under-/overreaction of prices to a variation in tax rates is ruled out.
1Sen (2001) and Marion and Muehlegger (2011), for example, empirically assess the pass-through of tax rates
by different levels of government in the cigarette and gasoline industries, respectively.
2Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) were among the first to suggest that, in oligopolistic and monopolistic
markets, taxes could be overshifted to final prices. Katz and Rosen (1985), Seade (1985) and Besley (1989)
are among the main theoretical references having taken up their point. For a detailed review on tax incidence
literature, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
3See, for instance, Keen (1997) and Devereux et al. (2007).
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Interestingly though, both strands of literature do have some common features. The func-
tional form of demand, for instance, plays a key role in both frameworks. In a tax incidence
setting, a linear demand function implies undershifting and an iso-elastic demand function re-
sults in overshifting of taxes.4 Similarly, in a vertical tax competition framework, the sign of the
reaction function is determined by the curvature of demand.5 An iso-elastic demand function
implies tax complementarity (i.e., a positive vertical reaction function) and a linear demand
gives the opposite result: strategic substitutability (i.e., a negative reaction function).
As the functional form of demand, market structure plays a key role in both settings as
well. Nevertheless, as we will show throughout this paper, whilst the role of the curvature of
the demand function is clear and well-defined in both settings, this is not the case concerning
market structure. In tax incidence settings, the importance of market concentration is fairly
clear. A perfectly competitive market implies that taxes are fully shifted. In oligopolistic mar-
kets though, taxes can be passed more (less) than proportionally to consumer prices i.e., taxes
can be overshifted (undershifted). Moreover, in imperfectly competitive markets, the level of
market concentration (generally proxied by the number of firms in the industry) determines the
degree of such an (over)reaction. The shifting is maximized in the monopoly case and minimized
under perfect competition.6 From a tax competition perspective, the role of market concentra-
tion is less clear. On the one hand, most of the empirical papers studying tax competition
issues use data on excise taxes that are usually levied in highly concentrated industries such
as the cigarette, gasoline and alcohol beverages ones.7 Indeed, some of these empirical studies
recognize the interconnection between taxes and market structure as one of the causes of endo-
4For the sake of correctness, two parameters define the under/overshifting condition in tax incidence models:
the functional form of demand and cost functions. Though, as described by Seade (1985) and Besley (1989),
under fairly standard assumptions and without too much loss of generality, the tax incidence condition is uniquely
determined by the curvature of the demand function.
5Keen (1997) is among the first to show the importance of the functional form of demand to determine the
sign of the vertical reaction function. Devereux et al. (2007) extend Keen’s setting by allowing for horizontal
competition (introduced by cross-border shopping) in the spirit of Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001).
In a recent paper, Agrawal (2015) goes one step forward an extends Devereux et al. (2007) by introducing
multiple competing federal governments and, thus, by allowing for diagonal externalities i.e., fiscal externalities
between neighboring jurisdictions that are of a different level of government. Interestingly, in all these settings,
the functional form of demand plays is one of the key parameters defining the sign of the respective reaction
functions.
6In Jametti et al. (2013), the authors empirically show that not accounting for the interaction of market
structure and tax rates could lead to a misleading estimation of tax incidence.
7Harris (1987) is among the first to empirically study the incidence of commodity taxes by assessing the 1983
federal cigarette tax increase in the United States. More recently, Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) analyze the
incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes in the European cigarette market and DeCicca et al. (2013) focus on
the impact of price search on the shifting of cigarette excise taxes. Kenkel (2005) and Marion and Muehlegger
(2011) are two empirical papers focusing on alcohol beverages and gasoline markets, respectively.
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geneity due to reverse causality bias, i.e. governments do influence market structure through
tax rates but market concentration also has an impact on the tax setting decision through the
tax base.8 Nevertheless, at most, these studies have only tackled this issue as a potential source
of endogeneity but none of them has assessed the impact of market structure on tax rates per se.
Even more striking is the role of market structure in theoretical tax competition literature. By
assuming constant producer prices, these settings explicitly rule out any under-/overreaction of
prices and only allow for a full shifting of tax rates to prices.
To sum up, while tax incidence models consider taxes as exogenously determined, tax com-
petition settings do not allow for a potential under-/overreaction of prices to taxes. The main
goal of this paper is to fill this gap by giving a first step in the direction of setting a comprehen-
sive theoretical framework where the tax setting process is endogenized and local governments
explicitly internalize the possibility of a more than proportional reaction of prices to tax rates.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, from a broad perspective, this model brings
together two strands of literature that, in spite of several common points, have only been studied
separately. The fact of formalizing the correspondence between the two main outcomes of both
frameworks is an important contribution to the existing literature in public economics. Second,
from a tax competition point of view, this model explicitly allows market structure to play a role
in the tax setting process. Thus, the features of tax incidence settings that were ruled out from
previous tax competition studies are now explicitly introduced in the first stage of the model.
Allowing taxes to be under-/overshifted turns out to have an impact (through market structure)
on the sensitivity of the vertical reaction function.
Our results confirm that the functional form of demand plays a key role in determining both
i) whether taxes are under-, fully- or overshifted and ii) whether taxes are strategic complements
or substitutes. Even if it is not possible to solve the model for the general case, an interesting
correspondence between these two results based on the most studied cases in the literature
(i.e. linear and iso-elastic demand functions) arises as one of the main outputs of the model.9
Finally, what are the consequences of relaxing the assumption that producer prices are constant?
The main output of strategic complementarity/substitutability does not change with respect to
previous findings but, unlike previous models, the number of firms in the industry arises as one
of the determinants of the vertical reaction function. Indeed, in this setting, market structure
determines how sensitive local tax rates are to a given variation in the federal tax rate. In the iso-
elastic case, for instance, the vertical reaction function is always positive (as in previous models)
but decreasing on the number of firms. This last piece of information is absent in traditional tax
8See, for example, Becker et al. (2012) and Jametti et al. (2013).
9This is another common feature of both strands of literature. Most of the conclusions are drawn on the
linear and iso-elastic demand cases. See, for example, Besley (1989) and Keen (1997), just to mention one of the
main references of each framework.
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competition models and is particularly relevant for taxes levied in highly concentrated industries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In next section the model is set up and
solved backward. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 assess the role of what we call the missing links between
tax incidence and tax competition literature i.e., the functional form of demand and market
structure, respectively. Finally, Section 3.5 provides some concluding remarks.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Setting
This model extends a traditional Cournot one-stage game as the one developed in Tirole (1988)
in two directions. First, and given the scope of the paper, we add an excise tax (τ = ti + T ) to
the profit function of the firm. ti is the tax rate applied by the local government in state i and
T is the excise tax rate applied by the federal one. to the profit function of the firm. Moreover,
we add a first stage where local governments aim at maximizing revenue by choosing their tax
rates t. The goal of the model is to endogenize the tax setting decision by assuming that local
policy makers anticipate the reaction of firms to t and adjust their decisions in consequence. In
other words, local governments take firm’s under/overshifting of taxes into account when setting
the tax rates.
There are three different agents in this economy: policy makers (federal and lower-tier gov-
ernments), producers and consumers.10 The federal government sets a tax rate T that is assumed
exogenous for the rest of the agents. Then, in the first stage of the game, local governments
in each state j = 1, ..., S play Nash with respect to the federal government and react to T by
setting tj in order to maximize revenue Rj = tjXj , where Xj is the tax base.
There are i = 1, ..., N profit-maximizing firms competing à la Cournot by choosing their
level of output qi so that
∑N
i=1 qi = Q.
Finally, following Keen (1997), we characterize consumers’ preferences by the indirect utility
function ν(P ) + Γ(g,G), where νi(·) and Γi(·) are strictly concave; g and G are the quantities of
local and federal public goods, respectively and P is the consumer price of the taxed good. We
assume additivity in (·) in order to assure that the demand for the taxed good, x(P ) = −ν ′(P )
(by Roy’s identity), is independent of public expenditure.
The model is set as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the tax policy t is determined.
In the latter one, firms maximize profits given the tax rates set in the previous stage and the
equilibrium is determined. The model is solved backwards.
10The lower tier of government will be called local or state government throughout the paper.
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3.2.2 Backwards solution
Second stage
Let us turn to the Cournot-Nash game in which identical firms compete by choosing their level
of output qi conditional on the expectations of their competitors’ output levels. Let firm i’s
profit function be:
pii = P (qi +Q−i)qi − c(qi)− τqi, (3.1)
where qi is the level of output of firm i, Q−i is the output of all other firms in the industry and
P (Q) is the inverse demand function for market demand Q. Finally, c(·) is the cost function
that we assume identical for each firm. Indeed, since our model focuses on symmetric equilibria,
we assume symmetric firms. Thus,
Nq = Q. (3.2)
Hence, we drop subscripts and re-express Equation (3.1) as follows:
pi = P (Nq)q − c(q)− τq. (3.1’)
The first and second order conditions for a given firm are
pi′ = P ′q + P − c′ − τ = 0 (3.3)
pi′′ = P ′′q + 2P ′ − c′′ < 0. (3.4)
Finally, solving Equation (3.3) for q, we get the following equilibrium expression for the firms’
output:
qˆ = c
′ + τ − P
P ′
. (3.5)
First stage
We now move to the first stage of the game, where local tax rates are set.11 As we only focus
on the vertical interaction, we assume symmetric states (tj = t); each consisting of a single
representative consumer. In addition, we assume that the tax base is completely immobile across
states. These two assumptions considerably simplify the model. First, we rule out horizontal
competition and, second, by imposing a single consumer we can define the tax base for each state
equal to the individual demand of the single consumer living in that jurisdiction i.e., X = x(P ).
11Let us clarify a notation issue. For the sake of comparability with previous tax incidence and tax competition
studies, we decided to stick to the standard notation used in each framework. Thus, the notation in the first and
second stages of the model are slightly different as once can observe by comparing, for example, the equations
defining the first order conditions in each stage. Whilst in Equation (3.3) we use pi′ to indicate "the derivative of
the profit function with respect to q", in Equation (3.6), "the derivative of the revenue function with respect to t"
is indicated by dR
dt
rather than R′.
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Indeed, using the equilibrium condition (X = Q), we can define the tax base in each state as
X = x(P ) = Q.
Local governments are Leviathans and, thus, aim at maximizing revenue R = tX = tQ by
setting t. Therefore, the first and second order conditions of the revenue maximizing problem
are:
dR
dt
= Q+ tdQ
dt
= 0 (3.6)
d2R
dt2
= 2dQ
dt
+ td
2Q
dt2
< 0. (3.7)
Now, solving Equation (3.6) for t by using dQdt =
dQ
dP
dP
dt , we obtain the following expression for
the equilibrium tax rate:12
tˆ = − Q
dQ
dP
dP
dt
. (3.8)
Finally, we can rewrite Equation (3.8) in ad-valorem terms as follows:
tˆ
P
= − 1
dQ
dP
P
Q
dP
dt
= 1
dPdt
, (3.9)
where  = −dQdP PQ > 0 is the elasticity of the aggregate demand function.
As expected, by assuming dPdt = 1, we are back to the standard formula present in previous
tax competition settings indicating that the optimal tax rate (in ad-valorem terms) is inversely
proportional to the elasticity of the tax base that was already derived in ,for example, Keen
(1997) and Devereux et al. (2007).13 By relaxing this assumption, we explicitly allow policy
makers to consider tax incidence features when setting their tax rates. In other words, local
governments recognize that taxes are not necessarily fully-passed to consumer prices but can
also be under/overshifted; and take this into consideration when setting t. We come back to the
implications of allowing for dPdt 6= 1 in Section 3.4.
3.3 The effect of the functional form of demand
In Section we briefly discussed why we think that the functional form of demand and market
structure are the missing links between tax incidence and tax competition models. Let us know
formalize this idea.
12From the second stage we know that P (Q(N, c, τ)). Thus, by applying the chain rule, we get dQ
dt
= dQ
dP
dP
dt
.
13A few empirical papers assess the different pass-through depending of the level of government levying the
tax (Chouinard and Perloff (2007), Marion and Muehlegger (2011)). Nevertheless, this remains an empirical issue
and, as it is standard in theoretical tax incidence models, we assume that firms shift tax rates to consumers
without considering this.
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3.3.1 The impact of the functional form of demand on tax incidence
Let us follow the standard notation in tax incidence models that has been first defined in Seade
(1980) and rewrite Equation (3.4) as follows:
P ′
N
(η +N +Nk) < 0, (3.10)
where η = QP ′′P ′ is the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function and k = 1 − c
′′
P ′
measures the relative slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves. Using this notation, we
can now differentiate Equation (3.3) to get:
dq
dτ
= 1
P ′(η +N + k) . (3.11)
Thus,
dQ
dτ
= N
P ′(η +N + k) (3.12)
and, therefore,
dP
dτ
= P ′dQ
dt
= N
N + η + k . (3.13)
Equation (3.13) shows the standard tax incidence condition that can be summarized as follows:14
dP
dτ
= N
N + (η + k)

< 1 ⇒ undershifting
= 1 ⇒ full shifting
> 1 ⇒ overshifting
Let us highlight some of the implications of Equation (3.13) that will be useful for the rest
of the paper. First, in a perfectly competitive market (N → ∞), taxes are fully shifted, i.e.
dP
dτ = 1. Second, once we leave the perfect competition scenario, i) the tax incidence condition
depends on the curvature of the demand and cost functions and; ii) market structure does not
determine the sign of dPdτ but defines the degree of the shifting, i.e. no matter whether taxes are
under- or overshifted, the shifting is maximized in the monopoly case and minimized as N →∞.
As we have already mentioned in Section 3.1, the curvature of the demand function is a key
parameter in tax incidence literature. Let us now illustrate its importance by assuming linear
costs (c′′ = 0 and, thus, k = 1) and analyzing the implications of Equation (3.13) for the two
most studied functional forms of demand, i.e. iso-elastic and linear demand functions.
14Most of tax incidence models analyze a game of the Cournot type. Interestingly though, Anderson et al.
(2001) find a similar tax incidence condition in a differentiated product oligopoly à la Bertrand.
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Iso-elastic demand function
If costs are linear, a necessary and sufficient condition for taxes to be overshifted is that η < −1.15
If demand is of the constant elasticity type, this is always the case. Note that a demand elasticity
 > 0, implies that η = −1+ < −1 for all . Indeed, in this case, Equation (3.13) can be re-
expressed as follows:
dP
dτ
= N
N − 1+ + 1
> 1. (3.14)
Thus, in the linear cost/iso-elastic demand case there is always overshifting.
Linear demand function
Similarly, with linear costs and a linear demand function (P ′′ = 0 and, thus, η = 0), Equation
(3.13) is simplified as follows:
dP
dτ
= N
N + 1 < 1. (3.15)
Thus, in the linear cost/linear demand case, taxes are always undershifted and overshifting can-
not occur.
We have shown that, once costs are assumed to be linear, the curvature of the demand
function is the key parameter defining whether taxes are under- or overshifted. Nevertheless, the
intuition behind this concept and its effect on the incidence of taxes might not be straightforward.
Let us thus show graphically how the tax incidence condition depends on the curvature of the
demand function by analyzing the simplest possible case, where there is only one firm in the
industry.16
In a monopolistic market, and assuming a linear cost function, the condition for overshifting
is now as follows:
dP
dτ
= 12 + η > 1⇔ η < −1. (3.16)
Note that η < −1 implies that the demand curve is steeper than the marginal revenue curve.
Why? An increase in the tax rate of ∆τ shifts the effective marginal cost from MC0 = c + τ0
15As one can observe from Equation (3.13), the overshifting condition should include a second bound. For
instance, in the monopoly case, the necessary and sufficient condition for overshifting should be −2 < η < −1
rather than η < −1. Similarly, in the duopoly case, it should be −3 < η < −1 and so on. This second bound
(formally given by | η |<| N+k |) is systematically neglected and (implicitly) assumed to hold in the tax incidence
literature. To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is Fullerton and Metcalf (2002). In page 32, the
authors briefly analyze tax incidence in monopolistic markets and show that the condition for overshifting is
−2 < η < −1. Though, in the rest of the chapter they refer to η < −1 as being a necessary and sufficient
condition for overshifting. Because of comparability reasons and given that this second bound does not affect the
main results of our model, in rest of the paper we follow previous studies and consider η < −1 to be the necessary
and sufficient condition for overshifting.
16This application is an extension of Anderson et al. (2001).
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to MC1 = c + τ1. Thus, the equilibrium marginal revenue also increases by ∆τ . If demand is
steeper than marginal revenue,
P ′ < (P ′Q+ P )′ ⇔ P ′ < P ′′Q+ 2P ′ ⇔ −1 < P
′′
P ′
Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
. (3.17)
Now, η < −1 is always true if the demand is iso-elastic (η = −1+ < −1) and is never true
if demand is linear (η = 0 > 1). Therefore, in the iso-elastic demand case (Figure 3.1) taxes are
always overshifted and, if the demand function is of the linear type as in Figure 3.2, taxes are
always undershifted.
Figure 3.1: Tax incidence and the functional form of demand (Iso-elastic demand)
3.3.2 The impact of the functional form of demand on tax competition
One of the key features of the first stage of the game is given by the two tiers of government
taxing the same good and, thus, sharing the tax base. From a tax competition perspective,
we are interested in the strategic interactions arising because of this. How does a variation in
T affects the state’s choice of t? As discussed in Section 3.1, this question has already been
deeply analyzed in tax competition literature. The main outcome of previous studies can be
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The vertical reaction function dtdT depends on the functional form of the demand
function. First, if x(P ) = x¯ so that individual demand is inelastic, then in the neighborhood of
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Figure 3.2: Tax incidence and the functional form of demand (Linear demand)
Nash equilibrium, dtdT = 0. Second, in the symmetric case, once we allow for individual demand
function to be elastic, the sign of the reaction function is undefined for the general case. Indeed,
the sign of dtdT depends on the elasticity of the demand function and, interestingly, the two most
analyzed cases in the literature have the following implications:
• If demand is iso-elastic, dtdT > 0 (t and T strategic complements)
• If demand is linear, dtdT < 0 (t and T are strategic substitutes)
Given the scope of the paper, our interest is on the role of the curvature of the demand
function. Does the functional form of demand have an impact on the vertical reaction function
studied in previous models? Once again, to answer these questions, let us concentrate on the
two cases previously discussed.
Iso-elastic demand function:
Let us first recall the expression for the equilibrium tax rate (in ad valorem terms) derived in
Equation (3.9),
tˆ
P
= 1
dPdt
. (9)
We are interested in the vertical reaction function i.e., we want to asses the reaction of state
governments to a variation in the federal tax rate. To say it differently, we want to know how
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the equality in Equation (3.9) will be affected by a variation in T and, particularly, how t will
adjust in order to restore it.
Plugging Equation (3.14) in Equation (3.9), we obtain:
tˆ
P
= 1

(
1− 1
N
)
. (9.1)
An increase in T will rise the consumer price P and, thus, reduce the left hand side of Equation
(9.1). Given that the elasticity of demand is constant (¯), the only way to restore the equality
(in the fixed-N case) is through an increase in t. Thus, in the iso-elastic demand/linear cost
case, dtdT > 0 and taxes are strategic complements.
Linear demand function:
Let us now move to the linear cost/linear demand case. The starting point is, again, the
expression for the equilibrium tax rate given by Equation (3.9):
tˆ
P
= 1
dPdt
. (9)
For the sake of simplicity, let us just re-express Equation (3.9) as follows:
tˆ = 1
−
(
Q′
Q
)
dP
dt
. (9.2)
Plugging Equation (3.15) in Equation (9.2), we get:
tˆ = 1
−
(
Q′
Q
)
N
N+1
. (9.3)
Finally, we apply the same reasoning as for the previous case. An increase in T will rise the
consumer price P and, thus, Q will decrease. Given that the elasticity of demand is linear, the
slope of the demand curve is constant (Q¯′) and, therefore (in the fixed-N case), the equality
in Equation (9.3) can only be restored by decreasing t. Thus, in the linear demand/cost case,
dt
dT < 0 and taxes are strategic substitutes.
Let us thus summarize the first result of our model by the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 In the symmetric case, at symmetric Nash equilibrium, the following correspon-
dence between the pass through of taxes into consumer prices and the vertical reaction function
arises:
• dPdτ < 1⇔ dtdT < 0
• dPdτ > 1⇔ dtdT > 0
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The simple inspection of Conjecture 1 already shows how the model nicely merges the outputs
of tax incidence and tax competition frameworks. Unfortunately, as stated in Proposition 5, in
a tax competition framework one cannot expect to sign the reaction function dtdT for the general
case. Hence, specific forms of demand and cost functions are often imposed in order to make
the results more intuitive. This is also the case in this model. Nevertheless, we honestly believe
that the correspondence described in Conjecture 1 and illustrated in Table 3.1 is a strong result
and has some practical implications.
Table 3.1: Correspondence between the reaction function and the tax incidence condition
Tax incidenceTax competition Strategic substitutes ( dtdT < 0) Strategic complements (
dt
dT > 0)
Undershifting X Not possible
(dPdτ < 1)
Overshifting Not possible X
(dPdτ > 1)
Let us suppose, for instance, that an econometrician aims at estimating the pass through of
taxes in a given market but, as it is frequently the case, does not have reliable data on market
concentration. Based on Conjecture 1, she will be able to infer whether taxes are under- or
overshifted by only estimating the vertical reaction function.
3.4 The role of market structure
3.4.1 The impact of market structure on local tax rates
Let us now move to the impact of market structure. One first step to assess the role of market
concentration in the this setting is through the direct impact of N on the tax setting decision
i.e., dtdN .
First, we totally differentiate equation (3.6) by applying the Implicit function theorem as
follows:
dt
dN
= −
dF
dN
dF
dt
= −
dQ
dN + t
d( dQdt )
dN
2dQdt + t
d2Q
dt2
= 1
D
 dQ
dN
+ t
d
(
dQ
dt
)
dN
 , (3.18)
where D = −
[
2dQ
dt
+ td
2Q
dt2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(3.7)
> 0. Hence, the sign of dtdN is given by the sign of
dF
dN :
dF
dN
= dQ
dN
+ t
d
(
dQ
dP
dP
dt
)
dN
. (3.19)
The presence of second derivatives makes this generally difficult to evaluate. Thus we assess dtdN
by focusing on the linear and constant elasticity demand cases.
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Constant elasticity demand function
Let us first re-express Equation (3.19) as follows:
sign
(
dt
dN
)
= sign
(
dF
dN
)
= sign
 dQdN︸︷︷︸
(a)
+t
d
(
dQ
dP
dP
dt
)
dN
 , (3.20)
where
d
(
dQ
dP
dP
dt
)
dN
=
d
(
dQ
dP
)
dN︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
dP
dt︸︷︷︸
(c)
+ dQ
dP︸︷︷︸
(d)
d
(
dP
dt
)
dN︸ ︷︷ ︸
(e)
. (3.21)
The standard iso-elastic demand function is given by
Q = AP−, (3.22)
where, A > 0 is the scaling factor and  = −dQdP PQ is the elasticity of demand. Thus, the inverse
demand function is, thus, given by
P =
(
A
Q
) 1

. (3.23)
The solution of the profit maximization problem for the CED is given by the following equilib-
rium values:17
Qˆ = A
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]−
, (3.24)
Pˆ = N(c+ t)
N − 1 . (3.25)
We use these expressions and our results in the second stage of the model to compute the
required expressions in order to sign dtdN as follows:
(a) dQ
dN
= Qˆ
N

N − 1 =
A
N
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]− 
N − 1 (3.26)
(b)
d
(
dQ
dP
)
dN
= − Qˆ
N2
+ 1
c+ t = −
A
N2
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]− + 1
c+ t (3.27)
(c)dP
dt
= N
N − 1
= N
N− 1 (3.28)
(d)dQ
dP
= −A
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]−−1
(3.29)
(e)
d
(
dP
dt
)
dN
= − 1
(N − 1 )2
= − (N − 1)2 (3.30)
17The profit maximization problems for both the iso-elastic and linear demand cases are solved in Appendix
A.
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Therefore, from equations (3.20) and (3.21),
sign
dt
dN
= A
N
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]− 
N − 1 > 0 (3.31)
Hence, in the constant elasticity demand and linear cost case, dtdN > 0.
Linear demand function
Let the linear demand function be given by Q = 1− P and, thus, the inverse demand function
be P = 1 − Q. Thus, the solution of the profit maximization problem gives us the following
optimal values:
Qˆ = N(1− c− t)(N + 1) (3.32)
Pˆ = c+ t+ (1− c− t)(N + 1) . (3.33)
Once again, to sign dtdN we need to compute the following expressions:
(a) dQ
dN
= (1− c− t)(N + 1)2 (3.34)
(b)
d
(
dQ
dP
)
dN
= 0 (3.35)
(c)dP
dt
= N
N + 1 (3.36)
(d)dQ
dP
= −1 (3.37)
(e)
d
(
dP
dt
)
dN
= 1(N + 1)2 (3.38)
Therefore,
sign
(
dt
dN
)
= (1− c− t)(N + 1)2 + t
(
(−1) 1(N + 1)2
)
= (1− c− 2t)(N + 1)2 . (3.39)
Hence,
dt
dN
R 0⇔ 1− c− 2t R 0 (3.40)
In other words, in the linear demand/cost case, the impact of market structure can be either
positive or negative depending on the following condition:
dt
dN
R 0⇔ t Q 1− c2 . (3.41)
As we mentioned already in Section 3.1, the relationship between taxes and market structure
has been largely studied both in theoretical and empirical literature. Nevertheless, to the best
of our knowledge, the impact of market structure on tax rates has not been assessed per se. Our
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results show that, in the linear cost/iso-elastic demand case, local tax rates are increasing in the
number of firms in the industry.18 One possible interpretation of this results might be related
to welfare issues. As we discussed in Section 3.3, the shifting of taxes to prices is maximized
in a monopolistic market and is minimized in perfectly competitive markets. This might be an
incentive for the policy maker to apply higher tax rates to less concentrated industries.
3.4.2 The impact of market structure on tax incidence
Let us now briefly assess the impact of market concentration on the pass-through of taxes.19
Taking the derivative of Equation (3.13) with respect to the number of firms in the industry, we
obtain:
d
(
dP
dt
)
N
=
η − dηdN + k − dkdN
(N + η + k)2 . (3.42)
Equation (3.42) shows that the overall impact of market structure on tax incidence is com-
posed by the main effects that run through N , η and k and the respective second order effects
given by the impact of N on the latter two variables i.e., dηdN and
dk
dN . Interestingly, the second
order effects are not relevant when assuming linear costs (k = 1 ⇒ dkdN = 0) and either of the
two demand functions we are working with i.e., linear (η = 0 ⇒ dηdN = 0) or constant elasticity
(η = −1+ ⇒ dηdN = 0) demand functions. To put it differently, when the demand function is
of the constant elasticity type (and with linear costs), d(
dP
dt )
N =
− 1+

+1
(N− 1+

+1)2 < 0. On the other
hand, in the linear costs/linear demand case, d(
dP
dt )
N =
1
(N+1)2 > 0.
3.4.3 The impact of market structure on tax competition
Traditional vertical competition models assume producer prices to be constant (or they are
normalized to zero). Hence, consumer prices are given by P = t + T and, therefore dPdt = 1.
Thus, these settings obtain the standard expression that the tax rate (in ad-valorem terms) is
inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand (Equation (3.9)). As one can observe from
Equation (3.13), the dPdt = 1 condition is verified if and only if η + k = 0 or under perfect
competition (N → ∞). Assuming either of these two conditions to hold is quite a strong
statement that deserves, at least, some comments. First, note that η+k = 0 is far from being the
18When demand is linear, the impact of N on t is inconclusive and depends on the relationship between the
tax rate and the firm’s cost function.
19A first step in this direction has been taken in the first chapter of this thesis where we empirically analyze
the effect of market structure on tax incidence by introducing an interaction term of market structure and tax
rates in a classic tax incidence regression. The authors show that the introduction of this interaction term is
theoretically justified by the cross-derivative of tax incidence with respect to the number of firms in the industry(
d( dPdt )
dN
)
. Nevertheless, while the focus in Chapter 1 is mainly an empirical one; we now aim at tackling the
effects of market concentration on tax incidence from a theoretical perspective.
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general rule or even from representing the most important case in the literature. Indeed, under
the two most analyzed scenarios (linear costs (k = 1) and, either linear (η = 0) or iso-elastic
(η = −1+ ) demand functions), η + k 6= 0. Second, it would be even more striking to justify
dP
dt = 1 by assuming perfect competition. In particular, because most of these models focus on
excise taxes that are usually levied in highly concentrated industries such as gasoline, cigarette
or alcohol beverages markets. In other words, assuming constant producer prices and, thus,
imposing dPdt = 1 considerably simplifies the model but, on the other hand, such an assumption
has implications that seem, at least, difficult to justify from an economic perspective.
Our model, instead, relaxes this assumption by explicitly allowing dPdt 6= 1. Nevertheless, one
might argue that, even after relaxing this assumption, the main output of the model is exactly the
same as that of previous studies. In other words, the strategic complementarity/substitutability
condition depends on the curvature of demand exactly as in, for example, Keen (1997). Let
us thus briefly show how the output of this model differs from previous findings by taking the
linear cost/iso-elastic demand case and applying the same reasoning as in Section 3.3.
In traditional tax competition studies, dPdt = 1 and, thus, Equation (3.9) is simplified as
follows:
tˆ
P
= 1

. (9.4)
An increase in T will rise the consumer price P and, thus, reduce the left hand side of Equation
(9.4). Given that the elasticity of demand is constant (¯), t has to increase in order to restore
the equality in Equation (9.4). Thus, taxes are strategic complements; exactly as in our setting.
By comparing Equations (9.1) and (9.4), one can already identify the main difference be-
tween previous studies and our setting. Whilst the number of firms (N) was absent in previous
tax competition models, it is explicitly introduced in our setting. As we have shown, in a tax
incidence framework, N does not determine the under-/overshifting condition but the degree
of the shifting. Similarly, the number of firms does not define the sign of the vertical reaction
function but determines how reactive local governments are to a variation in the federal tax
rate. In other words, N does not modify the complementarity/substitutability condition but
defines the sensitivity of t to a variation in T .
To make this point more clear, let us present a simple numerical application of the linear
cost/iso-elastic demand model based on the U.S. cigarette market.20 We calibrate our model by
plugging the values for T , P and  in order to show how the sensitivity of t to a 1% increase in T
varies for different values of N . We take prices and taxes figures from Orzechowski and Walker
(2012).21 Regarding the price elasticity of cigarette demand, an important variance among
20Tables 3.4 and 3.5 and Figure 3.4 show the results for the linear cost/linear demand case.
21The annual compendium on tobacco revenue and industry statistics known as The Tax Burden on Tobacco
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the different estimates is observed in the literature. The estimates seem to vary considerably
depending, for instance, on the different methodologies and samples. As one could expect, the
estimates seem to be highly dependent on the target group as well. Different studies focus on
particular groups in order to cluster by age, sex, socioeconomic situation, educational attainment
or even a particular characteristics such as pregnancy.22 To calibrate our model, we take the
estimates of Ding (2003) and Hana and Chaloupka (2004) and set the elasticity of demand equal
to 1.4.23
To sum up, we first took P , T and the share of the final price explained by excise taxes (both
state and federal ones) from Orzechowski and Walker (2012). Second, we plugged our constant
elasticity value  = 1.4. Third, using Equation (9.1), we computed t and, finally, we imposed a
1% increase in T to compute the reaction of t for each value of N .
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the calibration of the model and Figure 3.3 illustrates the reaction
functions when dPdt = 1 is imposed (red-dashed line) and when there is no restriction on the
shifting condition (blue-solid line).
As one can observe, in both cases dtdT > 0. This reflects the complementarity condition that
holds under both frameworks. Now, the straight-dashed line indicates that the reaction function
is constant ( dtdT = 0.1789) and does not vary with N . On the other hand, the solid line shows
how, in this setting, the sensitivity of t to a variation in T decreases with the number of firms in
the industry. Indeed, note that the highest value of dtdT equals 0.6261 for the monopoly case and,
as N increases dtdT decreases. In the limit, when N → ∞, it converges to 0.1789. This makes
sense, given that under perfect competition dPdt = 1, which turns out to be the assumption made
by previous tax competition studies. To put it differently, in our setting, a 10% increase in T
would be followed by a reaction of local governments roughly lying between 6.3% and 1.8%,
depending on the level of concentration of the industry. Previous settings, would only consider
the lowest bound (1.8%) which, again, might be particularly misleading given the highest level
of concentration observed in those industries where excise taxes are levied. The 2002 economic
census published by the U.S. Department of Commerce shows that the largest four companies
in the cigarette industry accounted for 95.3% of total shipments.24. In such a concentrated
industry, one could expect the vertical reaction function to be much more sensible (and, thus,
closer to the highest bound) than in an less concentrated industry such as machine shops, for
is produced by the economic consulting firm Orzechowski and Walker and published by the Federation of Tax
Administrators.
22For a complete review on the estimates of the price elasticity of cigarette demand, see, Surgeon’s General
Report (2000).
23Youth is a particular sensitive group to price changes. We decided to set  = 1.4 because a value above
1.2 makes the comparability between the iso-elastic and linear demand cases easier. Nevertheless, our results are
robust and hold for any  > 0.
24www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0231sr1.pdf
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Table 3.2: Numerical application: Iso-elastic demand function (without restriction on dPdτ )
t dP/dt t/P 1/[ɛ (dP/dt)] T' P' t' t'/P' dT (in %) dt (in %) dt/dT
1 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 115.22 3.50 0.20 0.20 102.01 568.14 115.95 0.20 1.00 0.6261 0.6261
2 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 259.26 1.56 0.46 0.46 102.01 566.17 259.98 0.46 1.00 0.2783 0.2783
3 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 307.27 1.31 0.54 0.54 102.01 565.93 307.99 0.54 1.00 0.2348 0.2348
4 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 331.27 1.22 0.59 0.59 102.01 565.83 331.99 0.59 1.00 0.2178 0.2178
5 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 345.67 1.17 0.61 0.61 102.01 565.78 346.39 0.61 1.00 0.2087 0.2087
6 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 355.28 1.14 0.63 0.63 102.01 565.75 356.00 0.63 1.00 0.2031 0.2031
7 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 362.13 1.11 0.64 0.64 102.01 565.72 362.86 0.64 1.00 0.1992 0.1992
8 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 367.28 1.10 0.65 0.65 102.01 565.71 368.00 0.65 1.00 0.1964 0.1964
9 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 371.28 1.09 0.66 0.66 102.01 565.70 372.00 0.66 1.00 0.1943 0.1943
10 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 374.48 1.08 0.66 0.66 102.01 565.69 375.20 0.66 1.00 0.1926 0.1926
11 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 377.10 1.07 0.67 0.67 102.01 565.68 377.82 0.67 1.00 0.1913 0.1913
12 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 379.28 1.06 0.67 0.67 102.01 565.67 380.00 0.67 1.00 0.1902 0.1902
13 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 381.13 1.06 0.68 0.68 102.01 565.67 381.85 0.68 1.00 0.1893 0.1893
14 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 382.71 1.05 0.68 0.68 102.01 565.66 383.43 0.68 1.00 0.1885 0.1885
15 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 384.08 1.05 0.68 0.68 102.01 565.66 384.80 0.68 1.00 0.1878 0.1878
16 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 385.28 1.05 0.68 0.68 102.01 565.66 386.00 0.68 1.00 0.1872 0.1872
17 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 386.34 1.04 0.68 0.68 102.01 565.65 387.06 0.68 1.00 0.1867 0.1867
18 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 387.28 1.04 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.65 388.00 0.69 1.00 0.1863 0.1863
19 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 388.12 1.04 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.65 388.85 0.69 1.00 0.1859 0.1859
20 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 388.88 1.04 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.65 389.60 0.69 1.00 0.1855 0.1855
21 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 389.57 1.04 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.65 390.29 0.69 1.00 0.1852 0.1852
22 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 390.19 1.03 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.64 390.91 0.69 1.00 0.1849 0.1849
23 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 390.76 1.03 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.64 391.48 0.69 1.00 0.1846 0.1846
24 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 391.28 1.03 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.64 392.00 0.69 1.00 0.1844 0.1844
25 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 391.76 1.03 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.64 392.48 0.69 1.00 0.1841 0.1841
26 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 392.21 1.03 0.69 0.69 102.01 565.64 392.93 0.69 1.00 0.1839 0.1839
27 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 392.62 1.03 0.70 0.70 102.01 565.64 393.34 0.70 1.00 0.1837 0.1837
28 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 393.00 1.03 0.70 0.70 102.01 565.64 393.72 0.70 1.00 0.1836 0.1836
29 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 393.35 1.03 0.70 0.70 102.01 565.64 394.07 0.70 1.00 0.1834 0.1834
30 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 393.68 1.02 0.70 0.70 102.01 565.63 394.41 0.70 1.00 0.1833 0.1833
50 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 397.52 1.01 0.70 0.70 102.01 565.62 398.25 0.70 1.00 0.1815 0.1815
100 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 400.41 1.01 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.62 401.13 0.71 1.00 0.1802 0.1802
1000 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.00 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 403.72 0.71 1.00 0.1790 0.1790
hePTN
No restriction on dp/dt
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Table 3.3: Numerical application: Iso-elastic demand function (dPdτ = 1)
t dP/dt t/P 1/[ɛ (dP/dt)] T' P' t' t'/P' dT (in %) dt (in %) dt/dT
1 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
2 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
3 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
4 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
5 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
6 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
7 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
8 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
9 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
10 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
11 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
12 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
13 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
14 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
15 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
16 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
17 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
18 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
19 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
20 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
21 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
22 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
23 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
24 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
25 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
26 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
27 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
28 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
29 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
30 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
50 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
100 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
1000 101.00 564.60 1.40 -1.71 403.29 1.00 0.71 0.71 102.01 565.61 404.01 0.71 1.00 0.1789 0.1789
dp/dt=1
N T P e h
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity of the vertical reaction function (Iso-elastic demand)
which the four largest companies accounted for only 2.2% of total shipments. In other words,
unlike previous settings, our model not only allows the federal policy maker to know whether
local governments would increase or decrease their tax rates after a variation of the federal tax
rate, but how important would this reaction be.
3.5 Conclusion
This model brings together two strands of literature that, in spite of several points in common,
have been only studied separately. In both cases the curvature of the demand function is the key
parameter defining determining both whether taxes are under/overshifted and whether lower-
and higher-tier tax rates are strategic complements/substitutes. One of the main results of the
model is, indeed, the formalization of the existence correspondence between the main outputs of
tax incidence and tax competition frameworks. As it is shown in Conjecture 1, the undershifting
(overshifting) of taxes implies perfect substitutability (complementarity). We honestly think
that this is already a nice contribution to the theoretical literature in public economics.
Nevertheless, the main novelty of the model concerns market structure. One of the main
features of the model is to endogenize the tax setting process by allowing local governments to
internalize the possibility that taxes are over-/undershifted. In order to do this, we explicitly
relax the assumption that producer prices are constant that is present in previous tax competi-
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tion settings. Hence, the restriction that prices can only be fully-shifted to consumers is ruled
out of the first stage of the game and, therefore, market structure plays a key role in the tax
setting process.
Regarding tax competition, even if the number of firms does not modify the strategic com-
plementarity/substitutability condition, it determines the sensitivity of local tax setters to a
modification in higher-level tax rates. This piece of information was lost in previous tax compe-
tition settings. We think that our models nicely complements previous settings because it allows
the federal policy maker not only to know whether lower-tier governments would rise or decrease
their local tax rates given a variation in the federal tax, but also to assess how important such
a reaction would be.
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Appendix 3.A Solution of the profit maximization problem
3.A.1 Iso-elastic demand
Let the iso-elastic demand function be given by:
A = P−, (3.A.1.1)
and, thus, the inverse demand function be
P =
(
A
Q
) 1

, (3.A.1.2)
where A > 0 and  > 0.
Let the profits of a firm (in the symmetric case i.e., Nq = Q) with linear costs be:
pi = Pq − cq − τq. (3.A.1.3)
Thus, the first order condition is given by:25
P − c− τ + P ′q = 0⇔
(
A
Q
) 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P
−c− τ +
[
1

(
A
Q
) 1

−1 (
− A
Q2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P ′
q = 0, (3.A.1.4)
Thus solving equation (3.A.1.4) for q, we get:
qˆ = A
N
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]−
. (3.A.1.5)
Using equation (3.A.1.5) and the symmetric equilibrium condition Q = Nq, we get:
Qˆ = A
[
N(c+ t)
N − 1
]−
. (3.A.1.6)
And, finally, plugging equation (3.A.1.6) into equation (3.A.1.2), we get:
Pˆ = N(c+ t)
N − 1 . (3.A.1.7)
3.A.2 Linear demand
Let the linear demand function be given by:
Q = 1− P, (3.A.2.1)
and, thus, the inverse demand function be
P = 1−Q. (3.A.2.2)
25Again, we assume that the second order condition holds.
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Let the profits of a firm (in the symmetric case i.e., Nq = Q) with linear costs be:
pi = Pq − cq − τq. (3.A.2.3)
Thus, the first order condition is given by:26
P − c− τ + P ′q = 0⇔ (1−Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P
−c− τ − q = 0, (3.A.2.4)
where P ′ = −1 and 1−Q = 1−Nq.
Thus, solving equation (3.A.2.4) for q, we get:
qˆ = 1− c− τ
N + 1 . (3.A.2.5)
Using equation (3.A.2.5) and the symmetric equilibrium condition Q = Nq, we get:
Qˆ = N
N + 1(1− c− τ). (3.A.2.6)
And, finally, plugging equation (3.A.2.6) into equation (3.A.2.2), we get:
Pˆ = c+ τ + 1− c− τ
N + 1 (3.A.2.7)
26We assume that the second order condition holds and, thus, that the derived equilibrium is indeed a maxi-
mum.
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Appendix 3.B Numerical application (Linear demand)
Figure 3.4: Sensitivity of the vertical reaction function (Linear demand)
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Table 3.4: Numerical application: Linear demand function (without restriction on dPdτ )
t dP/dt T' P' Q' t' dT (in %) dt (in %) dt/dT
1 101.00 564.60 0.27 -0.05 104.56 10.80 0.50 102.01 565.11 0.24 9.79 1.00 -9.35 -9.3519
2 101.00 564.60 0.54 -0.05 52.28 16.20 0.67 102.01 565.27 0.47 14.18 1.00 -12.47 -12.4691
3 101.00 564.60 0.81 -0.05 34.85 21.60 0.75 102.01 565.36 0.70 18.57 1.00 -14.03 -14.0278
4 101.00 564.60 1.08 -0.05 26.14 27.00 0.80 102.01 565.41 0.92 22.96 1.00 -14.96 -14.9630
5 101.00 564.60 1.35 -0.05 20.91 32.40 0.83 102.01 565.44 1.14 27.35 1.00 -15.59 -15.5864
6 101.00 564.60 1.62 -0.05 17.43 37.80 0.86 102.01 565.47 1.36 31.74 1.00 -16.03 -16.0317
7 101.00 564.60 1.89 -0.05 14.94 43.20 0.88 102.01 565.48 1.58 36.13 1.00 -16.37 -16.3657
8 101.00 564.60 2.16 -0.05 13.07 48.60 0.89 102.01 565.50 1.80 40.52 1.00 -16.63 -16.6255
9 101.00 564.60 2.43 -0.05 11.62 54.00 0.90 102.01 565.51 2.02 44.91 1.00 -16.83 -16.8333
10 101.00 564.60 2.70 -0.05 10.46 59.40 0.91 102.01 565.52 2.24 49.30 1.00 -17.00 -17.0034
11 101.00 564.60 2.97 -0.05 9.51 64.80 0.92 102.01 565.53 2.46 53.69 1.00 -17.15 -17.1451
12 101.00 564.60 3.24 -0.05 8.71 70.20 0.92 102.01 565.53 2.68 58.08 1.00 -17.26 -17.2650
13 101.00 564.60 3.51 -0.05 8.04 75.60 0.93 102.01 565.54 2.90 62.47 1.00 -17.37 -17.3677
14 101.00 564.60 3.78 -0.05 7.47 81.00 0.93 102.01 565.54 3.12 66.86 1.00 -17.46 -17.4568
15 101.00 564.60 4.05 -0.05 6.97 86.40 0.94 102.01 565.55 3.34 71.25 1.00 -17.53 -17.5347
16 101.00 564.60 4.32 -0.05 6.53 91.80 0.94 102.01 565.55 3.56 75.64 1.00 -17.60 -17.6035
17 101.00 564.60 4.59 -0.05 6.15 97.20 0.94 102.01 565.55 3.78 80.03 1.00 -17.66 -17.6646
18 101.00 564.60 4.86 -0.05 5.81 102.60 0.95 102.01 565.56 4.00 84.42 1.00 -17.72 -17.7193
19 101.00 564.60 5.13 -0.05 5.50 108.00 0.95 102.01 565.56 4.22 88.81 1.00 -17.77 -17.7685
20 101.00 564.60 5.40 -0.05 5.23 113.40 0.95 102.01 565.56 4.44 93.20 1.00 -17.81 -17.8131
21 101.00 564.60 5.67 -0.05 4.98 118.80 0.95 102.01 565.56 4.66 97.59 1.00 -17.85 -17.8535
22 101.00 564.60 5.94 -0.05 4.75 124.20 0.96 102.01 565.57 4.88 101.98 1.00 -17.89 -17.8905
23 101.00 564.60 6.21 -0.05 4.55 129.60 0.96 102.01 565.57 5.10 106.37 1.00 -17.92 -17.9244
24 101.00 564.60 6.48 -0.05 4.36 135.00 0.96 102.01 565.57 5.32 110.76 1.00 -17.96 -17.9556
25 101.00 564.60 6.75 -0.05 4.18 140.40 0.96 102.01 565.57 5.54 115.15 1.00 -17.98 -17.9843
26 101.00 564.60 7.02 -0.05 4.02 145.80 0.96 102.01 565.57 5.76 119.54 1.00 -18.01 -18.0110
27 101.00 564.60 7.29 -0.05 3.87 151.20 0.96 102.01 565.57 5.98 123.93 1.00 -18.04 -18.0357
28 101.00 564.60 7.56 -0.05 3.73 156.60 0.97 102.01 565.58 6.19 128.32 1.00 -18.06 -18.0587
29 101.00 564.60 7.83 -0.05 3.61 162.00 0.97 102.01 565.58 6.41 132.71 1.00 -18.08 -18.0802
30 101.00 564.60 8.10 -0.05 3.49 167.40 0.97 102.01 565.58 6.63 137.10 1.00 -18.10 -18.1004
50 101.00 564.60 13.50 -0.05 2.09 275.40 0.98 102.01 565.59 11.02 224.90 1.00 -18.34 -18.3370
100 101.00 564.60 27.00 -0.05 1.05 545.40 0.99 102.01 565.60 22.00 444.40 1.00 -18.52 -18.5185
1000 101.00 564.60 270.00 -0.05 0.10 5405.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 219.55 4395.40 1.00 -18.69 -18.6850
N T P e
No restriction on dp/dt
Q dQ/dP
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Table 3.5: Numerical application: Linear demand function (dPdτ = 1)
t dP/dt T' P' Q' t' dT (in %) dt (in %) dt/dT
1 101.00 564.60 0.27 -0.05 104.56 5.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 0.22 4.39 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
2 101.00 564.60 0.54 -0.05 52.28 10.80 1.00 102.01 565.61 0.44 8.78 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
3 101.00 564.60 0.81 -0.05 34.85 16.20 1.00 102.01 565.61 0.66 13.17 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
4 101.00 564.60 1.08 -0.05 26.14 21.60 1.00 102.01 565.61 0.88 17.56 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
5 101.00 564.60 1.35 -0.05 20.91 27.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 1.10 21.95 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
6 101.00 564.60 1.62 -0.05 17.43 32.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 1.32 26.34 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
7 101.00 564.60 1.89 -0.05 14.94 37.80 1.00 102.01 565.61 1.54 30.73 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
8 101.00 564.60 2.16 -0.05 13.07 43.20 1.00 102.01 565.61 1.76 35.12 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
9 101.00 564.60 2.43 -0.05 11.62 48.60 1.00 102.01 565.61 1.98 39.51 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
10 101.00 564.60 2.70 -0.05 10.46 54.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 2.19 43.90 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
11 101.00 564.60 2.97 -0.05 9.51 59.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 2.41 48.29 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
12 101.00 564.60 3.24 -0.05 8.71 64.80 1.00 102.01 565.61 2.63 52.68 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
13 101.00 564.60 3.51 -0.05 8.04 70.20 1.00 102.01 565.61 2.85 57.07 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
14 101.00 564.60 3.78 -0.05 7.47 75.60 1.00 102.01 565.61 3.07 61.46 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
15 101.00 564.60 4.05 -0.05 6.97 81.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 3.29 65.85 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
16 101.00 564.60 4.32 -0.05 6.53 86.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 3.51 70.24 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
17 101.00 564.60 4.59 -0.05 6.15 91.80 1.00 102.01 565.61 3.73 74.63 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
18 101.00 564.60 4.86 -0.05 5.81 97.20 1.00 102.01 565.61 3.95 79.02 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
19 101.00 564.60 5.13 -0.05 5.50 102.60 1.00 102.01 565.61 4.17 83.41 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
20 101.00 564.60 5.40 -0.05 5.23 108.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 4.39 87.80 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
21 101.00 564.60 5.67 -0.05 4.98 113.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 4.61 92.19 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
22 101.00 564.60 5.94 -0.05 4.75 118.80 1.00 102.01 565.61 4.83 96.58 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
23 101.00 564.60 6.21 -0.05 4.55 124.20 1.00 102.01 565.61 5.05 100.97 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
24 101.00 564.60 6.48 -0.05 4.36 129.60 1.00 102.01 565.61 5.27 105.36 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
25 101.00 564.60 6.75 -0.05 4.18 135.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 5.49 109.75 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
26 101.00 564.60 7.02 -0.05 4.02 140.40 1.00 102.01 565.61 5.71 114.14 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
27 101.00 564.60 7.29 -0.05 3.87 145.80 1.00 102.01 565.61 5.93 118.53 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
28 101.00 564.60 7.56 -0.05 3.73 151.20 1.00 102.01 565.61 6.15 122.92 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
29 101.00 564.60 7.83 -0.05 3.61 156.60 1.00 102.01 565.61 6.37 127.31 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
30 101.00 564.60 8.10 -0.05 3.49 162.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 6.58 131.70 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
50 101.00 564.60 13.50 -0.05 2.09 270.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 10.97 219.50 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
100 101.00 564.60 27.00 -0.05 1.05 540.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 21.95 439.00 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
1000 101.00 564.60 270.00 -0.05 0.10 5400.00 1.00 102.01 565.61 219.50 4390.00 1.00 -18.70 -18.7037
dp/dt=1
N T P Q dQ/dP e
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